Since the commencement of the Arab Spring three years ago, the Arab world has witnessed extraordinary developments – the fall of four potentates who had ruled their countries for several decades; Saudi Arabia’s abandonment of its quietist foreign policy approach in favour of aggressive sectarian and strategic confrontations against Iran in theatres across the region; the extraordinary violence and bloodletting in Syria, and now the sudden and unexpected thaw in US-Iran relations. Separately, massive increases in US production of unconventional oil and gas, described as the “shale revolution”, now promise to qualitatively change the global energy scenario.
Saudi-Iranian estrangement originates in concerns relating to the impact of the Arab Spring in effecting political change in Bahrain, a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member. Viewing political reform in Bahrain as a precursor to similar demands in other neighbouring countries, as also concerns that this would further empower the Shias, Saudi Arabia has blamed Iran for “interference” in GCC affairs, accusing it of pursuing “Persian” and sectarian hegemony in the region. This competition is being played out in Syria where historic, religious, ethnic, sectarian, and strategic faultlines have engulfed the nation in an orgy of violence that has killed over 100,000 people and destroyed ancient cities and sacred shrines. Numerous warring militia, with secular, Salafi and extremist affiliations, are engaged in battles as fierce amongst themselves as against the national forces loyal to President Bashar Al Assad. Outside role-players, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, are actively supporting different groups, with Israel carrying out air attacks to destroy Al-Assad’s capabilities and supplies to the Hezbollah.
In this scenario of deep hostility, the dramatic US-Iran détente is a real game-changer. It has brought together on a common platform two countries that have been deeply estranged for over three decades, with the US leading the enforcement of far-reaching sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and effectively made it a pariah state. Now, Iran is poised to emerge as a legitimate and significant player in regional affairs.
Not surprisingly, this thaw has left Saudi Arabia and Israel bewildered and insecure. This is because, while the US and its western allies have been primarily concerned about Iran’s nuclear programme, in West Asia itself there have been more immediate concerns: for Israel, the threat from Hezbollah and Syria, and for Saudi Arabia, the security and ideological competition it faces from its northern neighbour. With the bogey of the “existential” Iranian threat receding from the region, both countries will now have to address issues they have long ignored: Israel will have to revive and participate constructively in the peace process, while Saudi Arabia will be compelled to look at domestic political, economic and social reform. Saudi concerns are aggravated by the fact that, with the shale revolution and increasing fuel-efficiencies, the US may dilute its involvement in Gulf affairs.
Of course, there is considerable hype about the impact of the hydrocarbon production from shale, with suggestions that it would lead to the US’s “energy independence” and dilute the importance of the principal oil-producers. Much of this is misconceived: the US will remain import-dependent to the extent of nearly 40 per cent even in 2035. Again, there is considerable uncertainty about the quantum of US unconventional production in the medium and long-term, leading observers to suggest that US shale oil production be seen as a “surge”, not a revolution. In any case, US production will decline from the 2020s.
During the next 10-15 years, as the US reduces its oil imports, most of the Gulf production will shift to Asia. The Asian giants – China, Japan, Korea and India – will depend on Gulf supplies to the extent of 60-90 per cent, while around 90 per cent of Gulf production will go to Asia.
These developments in the political and energy scenario have important implications for India. Besides energy links, the Asian giants have developed very substantial trade and investment connectivities with the Gulf countries: the GCC is India’s number one trade partner among economic groupings, and is home to over six million Indians who send back to India $35 billion annually. Besides benefiting from high-value two-way trade, the other Asian countries are also executing multi-billion dollar projects in the region. Again, outside the GCC, these Asian countries not only have important energy-related links with Iran and Iraq, for China and India ties with Iran have an important strategic value in terms of India’s interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and China’s energy and political ties with the Central Asian republics and Russia.
Iraq, with the steady development of its oil infrastructure, is poised to become a major global oil producer, possibly even reaching production of 6-8 million barrels per day in a couple of decades. Most of this oil will find its way to Asian markets. In short, the security and stability of the Gulf and West Asia are crucial for the long-term interests of the Asian countries. This calls for a review of the Asian security role in the Gulf.
For far too long, the Asian giants have pursued only their economic interests in the region, while the US has been responsible for regional security. This, it has done by maintaining its political and military hegemony, marked by periodic armed interventions that have wreaked havoc in the countries concerned and encouraged the proliferation of radical elements. It has also stultified the political evolution of the countries in the region, leaving their people frustrated and angry at their marginalisation in domestic, regional and world affairs. Given declining Western interests and capabilities and the crucial interest of the Asian giants in regional security, this is now a propitious moment for Asian countries to define and pursue a new security architecture in the region that would be inclusive and cooperative, one in which hegemony would be replaced by accommodation and consensus.
The challenges in realising this alternative arrangement are serious, for they would require the principal regional role-players to give up their present postures of confrontation and hostility, and engage with erstwhile enemies on the same platform for dialogue, establishment of confidence-building measures, and addressing of issues that divide them in a free and frank environment. Before this, the four principal Asian countries would themselves have to develop the habit of dialogue and pursuit of consensus, a daunting task since Asian countries have little experience of strategic dialogue with each other on continental issues. This may be difficult, but not impossible.
The pursuit of a cooperative security arrangement in the Gulf in tandem with diverse Asian allies will be an important challenge for Indian diplomacy in the coming years, for its success will be central to the realisation of this century as the ‘Asian Century’.
(Talmiz Ahmad is a former ambassador to Oman, UAE and Saudi Arabia)
