The iconic Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21, named, as all Soviet aircraft were in those days, for their designers, was first inducted into the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 1963. Ponder that for a moment. That was 56 years ago. And as news today confirms, the aircraft whose pilot has been posted ‘missing in action’ after engaging Pakistani aircraft intruding into Indian airspa-ce, is still seeing action on the country’s borders.
The MiG-21 was a transformational acquisition for the IAF, and in some ways even for India. It was the IAF’s first non-Western combat aircraft, and the first non-West-ern weapon system acqu-ired after Independence. It was a huge change, going far beyond the language of the manuals.
The Soviets had a different design philosophy, and completely different combat doctrines — hence completely different maintenance and operational practices.
In what would have been a case study in the private sector, the IAF made a conscious decision to take the technology, but not the procedures and tactics.
The IAF used the MiG-21, and later the Su-7 and other Soviet hardware in ways their designers had never intended. Because of the different ways we operated, we needed different ancillary equipment, maintenance schedules, and much else. The Soviets, planning for massive continent-wide land battles, built and deployed the MiG-21, as they did most of their military kit, in vast numbers, intending to stockpile them at different locations throughout Central Europe. If it came to war, their fighter regiments would fly them intensively from one location for a week or two of intense operations, with the emphasis on turning them around for a short period as fast as possible, and with no concern for preserving engine or airframe life. Operating life was measured in days, or at most weeks.
The MiG-21’s designers had not remotely imagined operating the same airframes for decades as India has done. They would have been flabbergasted at the longevity of this classic little 1950s design. When the IAF procured the MiG-21, initially largely as a respo-nse to Pakistan’s acquisition of missile-equipped F-104 Starfighters, we intended them as high-value assets, to be husbanded and carefully used, primarily against specific threats.
This imposed completely different maintenance needs, which we had to develop quite differently from the Soviet approa-ch. We developed maintenance processes, schedules for replacing parts and spares inventory requirements geared to longevity in ways the Soviets had never planned for.
Operationally also, we planned from the start to use our MiG-21s the way Western air forces do: in independent squadrons which could move quickly between bases operating other types as well. This is different from the Soviet/Warsaw Pact approach, of operating in regiments, about two or three times the size of a squadron, and generally operating one regiment of a single type from a base.
Over the decades, we have modified and used, and still use, the MiG-21 in many other ways. In a sense, the unique ways we learned to operate the MiG-21, and the unique methods we adopted, were a product of unique times and circumstances. All those have now changed, and the IAF is recognised for its ability to mix and match technologies from different sources. This makes for less than optimal fleet management and inventory constraints, sometimes – but it does say something about Indian ingenuity and jugaad.
A new generation of Indian aviators, including the first three Indian women qualifying as combat pilots, still use the MiG-21. At a time when the IAF is in the news, we might remember that we have done things with aircraft that even their designers didn’t think of.
(The writer has written on the IAF and military issues in developing countries for 20 years.)
