Lately, the Henderson Brooks report on the Sino-Indian War of 1962 has been much in the news. Facts leading to the debacle need to be stated before going into the details of this report. After the Communist Revolution, Mao Zedong became the supreme leader of China in 1948. In 1950, the Chinese intervened in Korea and moved into Tibet. Jawaharlal Nehru was one of our great stalwarts of the freedom movement and the architect of democracy in our county.
An iconic leader loved by the masses, he was a visionary who believed in world peace and tried to play the role of a modern Ashok. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, being a realist, clearly saw the threat posed by the Chinese presence in Tibet. A month before he passed away, he wrote to Nehru — on November 7, 1950 — that China was “concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet.
The final action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is little short of perfidy”. Nehru ignored this warning. He went out of his way to befriend China, advocating its membership of the United Nations and even declining the offer made to India of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, saying that it should go to Communist China.
Paniker, our ambassador in China, functioned more as China’s ambassador to India than India’s to China. Defence minister Krishna Menon, whom many said had pronounced Communist leanings in his early days, was abrasive with Service Chiefs and played favourites within the Services undermining discipline. The defence industry was producing coffee makers instead of defence weapons and equipment. Bhola Nath Mullik, the legendary intelligence chief, was Nehru’s Man Friday.
He went horribly wrong on two counts. First, the Chinese will not take any action against India’s Forward Policy. Second, the Chinese Air Force could bomb Indian cities from airfields in Tibet, when they did not then have this capability to do so. Thus, it was decided not to use our Air Force for offensive operations in support of the Army. As for military advice, reliance was put on B.M. Kaul, an officer from logistic branch, with no combat experience or background.
Ignoring the recommendation of Gen. K.S. Thimayya, the then Army Chief, Kaul was promoted lieutenant-general in 1960. In 1962, he was appointed to the key combat command for conduct of operations against the Chinese in the East. Nehru justified this appointment in Parliament, saying that Kaul was the most outstanding general of the Indian Army. Lt. Gen. Thorat, the Eastern Army Commander till 1961, had made out a realistic plan for defence in the Northeast based on the road head at Bomdi-la. This plan was ignored.
In pursuit of the Forward Policy, troops were sent up to Namka Chu river, three weeks’ journey by foot beyond Bomdi-la, without necessary logistic support. Gen. Thapar, who took over as Army Chief in 1961, was a pliant Chief. He accepted the unsound Forward Policy and even executed the order to throw the Chinese out of the Himalayas without question.
All this was an ideal setting for a Greek tragedy. A debacle became inevitable. Napoleon wrote that a general-in-chief who carries out orders that he feels are wrong must represent and get them changed. If this is not accepted, he must resign, otherwise he should be held guilty for the consequences. Nehru proved to be a poor war leader in the 1962 war.
In the Dunkirk debacle of 1940, the British field army was decimated and Britain was left without any ally. Churchill thundered in the House of Commons in June 1940: “… We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.” In November 1962, the bulk of the Indian Army was intact and the US was supporting India. Yet Nehru broadcast in despair: “My heart goes out to the people of Assam.” He accepted the Chinese offer of a humiliating unilateral ceasefire.
Lt. Gen. Henderson Brooks and Brig. P.S. Bhagat were commissioned to inquire into the causes of this great debacle. Their top secret report was not released by the government for over 60 years. The report got leaked and parts revealed by Neville Maxwell in his book, India’s China War, published in 1970. He has now reportedly downloaded portions of the report on the Internet when election fever is at its peak in India. The political parties have shown maturity by not making this into much of an electoral issue. The government has now released some portions of the report and is still holding on to some portions. It is ridiculous that it has even threatened to take legal action against Maxwell if he visits India.
The reasons for the worst debacle in the history of the Indian Army are too well known. These are neglect of defence preparedness, collapse of political and military leadership, sidelining of the military in decision-making, lack of élan among military officers, and foreign and defence policies not being in sync.
The threat from China in the Himalayas continues and has become even greater. Yet we have failed to sufficiently overcome our shortcomings of 1962. Acquisition of modern weaponry has been unpardonably slow and so also the development of infrastructure in border areas.
A.K. Antony has been the defence minister for nearly 10 years. He may have preserved his lily-white reputation for integrity but has damaged the functioning of his ministry. The pace of improving our defence capability has been deplorably slow. The state of civil-military operations in the ministry has never been as bad as during his tenure.
He dithered over effectively dealing with open defiance of an Army Chief for nearly a year causing much damage to the Service. At the same time, he was excessively quick in accepting the resignation of a forthright and much respected Naval Chief who has provided a unique instance of accepting moral responsibility. After two months there would be a new government in power at the Centre and a new defence minister in office.
Let us hope that they rise to the occasion and provide the nation an effective and impregnable defence shield.
