For centuries, great powers have sent warships to the Indian Ocean to protect their trade, for colonisation, to topple unfriendly governments, influence political events and gather intelligence about regional navies and ocean hydrography, which is vital for submarine operations.
In 2008, China — which had already built ports in Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan — used the pretext of anti-piracy patrols in the Horn of Africa to deploy three to four warships permanently in the Indian Ocean.
A few days before the loss of Malaysian Airways Flight MH 370, the Chinese Navy had informed the Indian defence attache in Beijing that a new Chinese Shang-class tactical nuclear submarine (SSN) had completed a two-month submerged patrol in the Indian Ocean and had returned to its base in Hainan Island after linking up with the Chinese warships on anti-piracy patrol off Somalia.
The message to India was clear — Chinese SSNs, remaining undetectable, could gather intelligence on Indian Navy deployments along with acoustic and electronic signatures of individual warships, while threatening India’s sea-borne trade should hostilities break out. Can India ever consider the option of deploying India’s only SSN (the Russian Akula-class, INS Chakra) on a two-month submerged patrol in the South and East China seas? Possibly not. But India can change the equation by urgently providing funds to induct at least four SSNs and a dozen long-range maritime patrol anti-submarine aircraft.
Subsequent Chinese Navy deployments have left little doubt in the minds of the international community about Chinese will to deploy its Navy to distant regions in order to further Chinese interests. These deployments are in addition to the deployment of Chinese Coast Guard and Naval units in the disputed South and East China seas, and off Somalia on anti-piracy patrol.
The Chinese Navy has 900 ships and 800 aircraft, and can “spare” three to four ships and one SSN or conventional submarine for deployment in the Indian Ocean. The China Coast Guard, created in 2013 by merging different agencies, has 1,800 vessels. The Indian Navy has about 140 ships and 250 aircraft and is expected to grow to 200 ships and 400 aircraft in a decade. The Indian Coast Guard has about 80 vessels and 55 aircraft. It is expected to stabilise at 160 ships and 100 aircraft by 2020.
The unexplained loss of MH 370 (a modern Boeing 777 airliner) in this age of satellite imagery and global connectivity made the international maritime community react with alacrity. Of the 239 people on that flight, 60 per cent were Chinese. The Chinese government took the lead with its satellites, ships and aircraft initially searching the accident areas in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand, and later shifted attention to the Southern Indian Ocean off Perth.
Nine Chinese Naval warships, including the two 20,000 tonne brand new amphibious warships, Kunlunshan and Jinggangshan, had arrived off Perth by March-end to commence search based on satellite inputs. Two Chinese IL-76 aircraft also flew to the Australian Air Force base at Perth, to join the search.
Satellite data provided by Thailand, France, China and the US was used to refine the search area of about 1,800 km west of Perth. India, that had five citizens onboard MH 370, reacted with slackness. Despite its space programme comprising numerous satellite launches, a lunar mission and an ongoing mission to Mars, there was no input whatsoever from our satellites. The Indian Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard did carry out air and sea searches in the Bay of Bengal and an Indian Navy aircraft along with an IAF Super Hercules aircraft were flown to Kuala Lumpur, but India took no part in the search in the Southern Indian Ocean, despite its Navy having capability to carry out such tasks.
The Indian Navy, a few years ago, sent warships to evacuate Indian citizens from war torn Lebanon and Libya. Following the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004, the Indian Navy and Coast Guard had won international acclaim for their prompt reaction to the humanitarian crisis. The Indian Navy has four 30,000-tonne oil replenishment ships, any one of which could have sailed along with a destroyer to look for MH 370.
Our modern ships have advanced acoustic sensors, including towed arrays, which could have detected the “pings” emanating from the two black boxes of MH 370. The British sent an SSN (HMS Tireless) to search for the two black boxes. Surely, India’s ultra modern SSN (INS Chakra) with a similar sophisticated acoustic sensor capability could have been sent to the Southern Indian Ocean.
The new Indian government needs to understand the term “comprehensive national power” and follow a dual policy towards China. It needs to enhance trade with China, welcome Chinese investment in Indian infrastructure while increasing its defence budget to three per cent of the GDP from two per cent. It also needs to double the Naval budget and modify its nuclear doctrine to ensure that it deters our two nuclear neighbours. And, finally, India and China need to urgently find a mutually acceptable solution to their border problem.
For this, India needs a new, decisive leader.
