As the 16th general election proceeds apace, the debates are becoming more acrimonious and the remarks of various candidates about each other more astringent. Amidst this sound and fury, one subject, for the most part, has been met with an almost deafening silence. It is the subject of India’s foreign policy. The election manifestos of both parties are quite anodyne and provide few clues to the goals and objectives that they would pursue once in office.
The only issue that has aroused some degree of interest and concern is the Bharatiya Janata Party’s stated goal of revisiting India’s “no first use” policy. Quite frankly, despite the spirited dialogue that this statement has engendered, it has, not surprisingly, remained an elite concern. The vast majority of the electorate is, in all likelihood, quite ignorant about the subject.
Those who follow issues of foreign and security policies would have noticed that the BJP’s likely candidate for the premiership, Narendra Modi, has focused attention on at least two foreign policy matters. The first focused on the People’s Republic of China and was made, appropriately enough, when he was on the campaign trail in the Northeast.
Not surprisingly, he took a tough and unyielding position on the integrity of India’s borders making clear that the country would not make territorial concessions to China. More to the point, he warned China to abandon its “expansionist attitude”.
The other remark was loaded with significance for both domestic politics and foreign policy and dealt with the United Progressive Alliance’s refugee policies. Specifically, Mr Modi argued that the regime was far more sympathetic towards refugees from Bangladesh as opposed to those from Pakistan. The remark was far from trivial because it reflected a deft attempt on his part to exploit a legitimate concern about illegal immigration from Bangladesh.
However, though he did not explicitly state it, any observer of Indian politics would know that his remark was pregnant with meaning. The vast majority of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh happen to be Muslims. Those fleeing Pakistan and seeking refuge
tend to be Hindus. Without openly saying as much he adroitly managed to communalise a very compelling issue that the UPA government as well as others have mostly ducked.
Beyond these two issues foreign policy has hardly played any role in the election campaign. The reasons are not far to seek. For most of India’s electorate matters of inflation, unemployment and public order are far more compelling than the seemingly ethereal realms of foreign policy. Consequently, most political parties choose to deal with these questions rather than dwell on matters that are either mostly incomprehensible or seem quite remote to their lives.
Yet it would be foolish to assume that foreign policy matters will not intrude on the agenda of the next government and Prime Minister. Obviously, any new regime will have to fashion a strategy to deal with China’s increased assertiveness along the Sino-Indian border. It will also have to devote considerable thought to how India can counter the growing influence of China in South Asia and especially in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Obviously, no regime can do much at this stage about China-Pakistan nexus.
Apart from the need to deal with the increasing boldness of China, the next government will be saddled with the likely consequences of the imminent drawdown of the US and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) from Afghanistan.
Even though the Nawaz Sharif regime has expressed some interest in improving ties with India through the expansion of bilateral trade there is no gainsaying the role of the Pakistani security establishment. It will not only act as a brake on any attempts to improve relations with India, but may well seek to revive the insurgency in Kashmir which has been dormant for some time.
These two foreign policy challenges are entirely predictable. Beyond these, however, lurks the dangers of possible instability in Bangladesh where the Awami League regime of Sheikh Hasina Wajed is on a precarious perch following a rather lopsided election which witnessed a boycott on the part of the principal Opposition party.
In Sri Lanka, the Mahinda Rajapakse government is continuing to bask in the warm embrace of China and rejoicing in its ethic triumphalism following the crushing of the Tamil insurgency. It therefore appears to be a genuine island of stability in an otherwise troubled region. Yet this stability may be more imaginary than real.
The unwillingness of the regime to address the legitimate grievances of the Tamils could well amount to be a veritable time bomb that could explode in yet another burst of ethnic discord. Obviously, Indian Tamils would not stand idly by and expect any regime in New Delhi to undertake appropriate diplomatic action.
Obviously, this brief discussion cannot adequately deal with the myriad foreign policy tasks that will crowd the agenda of the next government. However, it should serve as a quick reminder that despite the absence of vigorous discussion of these questions they nevertheless remain acutely relevant for the victors of this election. They can only ignore them at their own peril.
The writer is the director of the Centre on American and Global Security at Indiana University, Bloomington
