A country’s foreign policy does not alter with regime change, determined as it is by its neighbourhood, its intrinsic strength and the larger forces at play in the wider world. But the nature and scale of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s election triumph and its proclamation of a determined leader at the head are interesting pointers to a new, more nuanced projection of Indian foreign policy.
Narendra Modi’s decision to invite his counterparts in the neighbourhood for his swearing-in ceremony was a good beginning. It served the purpose of diminishing to an extent his hawkish image and was an opportunity to get to know the leaders, particularly from Pakistan and Sri Lanka, without raising expectations.
From the reactions to Mr Modi’s assumption of office has evoked around the world, particularly from China, Japan and the United States, it would appear that the wider world is keen to gauge the potential changes in New Delhi’s policy.
China is taking the lead in registering its interest while Japan is not far behind. And the US has been reiterating from President Barack Obama down, about how keen it is to get to know the new Prime Minister, despite the less than flattering history of the denial of a US visa.
Interestingly, Mr Modi has opted for an internal security man, Ajit Doval, rather than a practitioner in the foreign policy field as his choice for national security adviser. He seems to be contemplating to compensate this by appointing a foreign policy specialist as something of a strategic czar.
Obviously, a thorough assessment of India’s foreign policy parameters is the objective.
Some verities will not change. India has two problematic neighbours — Pakistan and China — it must deal with. The US, while in relative decline, remains the most important single power and is likely to remain so for the next 50 years. China has climbed the power structure dramatically in the last 30 years and aspires to a G2 relationship with the US.
Although the US and some of its European partners would want to accord Russia the status of a middling power, President Vladimir Putin has forcefully asserted his country’s ambitions and interests by his policies in relation to Crimea and Ukraine. He has annexed Crimea, essentially more Russian than Ukrainian historically and ethnically, while he has stepped back from a confrontational posture on Ukraine.
In a sense, Ukraine is unfinished business because it implied a contemptuous attitude by the US and the European Union to Russia’s basic interests in a landmass on its border with traditionally close, ethnic, linguistic, trade and religious affinities. Perhaps the West has learnt a few lessons from the Ukrainian tragedy and will show greater respect for Moscow’s basic interests in its neighbourhood.
The European Union, an impressive achievement in itself, is in the midst of soul-searching after the surge in far Right and Left groups in the European elections. The present crisis reflects national angst in many member nations over giving away too many powers to a collective. Combined with recent years’ austerity privations for many, particularly in the South, after the unprecedented prosperity they savoured in the post-World War II period, there is frustration. Inevitably, the “other”, the immigrant, is a universal object of hate.
India’s preoccupations with Pakistan and China are logical in view of the bloody past of Partition in one case and the fact that as it shares a disputed long border with the latter, even as Beijing has marched miles ahead in economic and military prowess. With the US, the last few years have been a period of marking time as the potential of the landmark nuclear agreement failed to yield expected fruit.
The reality is that China is vigorously asserting its interests in the region and farther afield in seeking parity with the US. America remains by far the greatest power, but it is war weary after its misadventures in the Middle East, while seeking to form coalitions to seek solutions to world problems.
For India, the choices are to seek to balance a variety of factors and nations even while promoting its economic compulsions, particularly in the export field. The relationship with Pakistan will remain troubled because of two looming factors: how Islamabad chooses to work in Afghanistan and how it tackles the terrorist problem at home. To an extent, it is in danger of being swallowed by the very terrorists it has cultivated as a lever of foreign policy.
The leaders of China and Japan are probably encouraged by the admiration Mr Modi has shown for the great economic and technological progress they have made. The Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, has always had a special place for India in his geopolitical vision, a factor that New Delhi must factor in, in its dealings. And Japan is the home of world-class technology.
Relations with China are more complex because Beijing has shown little sign of resolving the border problem and has been assiduous in cultivating India’s neighbours to leverage relations with New Delhi. Besides, the imbalance in the growing two-way trade is unsustainable in the long run. Yet, given the scale of the Chinese economy and its political clout, building a sustainable relationship is imperative.
The answer is to have a cleared-eyed view of India’s interests in an inter-connected world to take cogent steps to put the best foot forward. Russia remains an asset in various ways, not least in the defence field, and needs to be nurtured. Perhaps a more robust economic relationship with the United States is the answer in view of the prospect of greater foreign direct investment and more business-friendly policies of the Modi government.
In a sense, if the change in Indian administration removes some cobwebs in the traditional foreign policy pursued by successive governments, it would benefit India.
But pursuing the country’s interests in a changing world requires both wisdom and agility. We are living in a less ideological world and some of the shibboleths of the past are now just history.
