The activism on the foreign policy front of the newly anointed Narendra Modi government is, at one level, commendable. It was satisfying to see the leaders of our neighbouring countries present at his flamboyant swearing-in ceremony in the magnificent setting of the forecourt of the Rashtrapati Bhavan. His telephonic conversations with the Chinese Premier and with President Barack Obama also indicate a new willingness to take diplomatic initiative. The follow-up gift of a sari by Nawaz Sharif for Mr Modi’s mother is, indeed, a thoughtful gesture, and perhaps our Prime Minister will also reciprocate with something nice for Mariam, the Pakistani Premier’s daughter.
But while all this has made for good optics, it is pertinent to ask whether such moves are part of an overall, holistic framework. If complex foreign policy issues could be resolved by the pageantry of a ceremonial handshake, or by well chosen gifts, diplomacy would be a far easier animal to train than it presently is. Already, Mr Modi is realising that what appears, on the surface, to be an uncomplicated goodwill gesture can, in the real world of diplomacy, have unintended and unpleasant consequences. The invitation to President Mahinda Rajapakse of Sri Lanka provoked a united cry of protest by almost all political parties in Tamil Nadu; Bangladesh, where anti-India feelings often lurk just below the current bonhomie with Sheikh Hasina, found it fit not to respond at summit level and sent the Speaker as a representative; and in Pakistan,
Mr Sharif was at the receiving end of fairly eloquent condemnation for not having raised the issue of Kashmir while he had dinner with our new Prime Minister.
The fact of the matter is that ground realities in South Asia require less of the ad hoc gestures of goodwill and more of the midnight candle of rigorous planning within the framework of a carefully calibrated holistic strategic and security doctrine. At the time when Mr Modi displayed his first flurry of diplomatic activism, his government had not even been sworn in, he had no foreign minister, and the national security adviser was not appointed. He was, as a seasoned foreign policy analyst put it, flying blind. The only guide to his foreign policy guidelines were his own comments during his election campaign.
These, as Mr Modi, will readily admit, may live to haunt him. His approach then was transparently jingoistic; he ridiculed every attempt by the previous government to engage with Pakistan as an unwarranted capitulation in the face of continuous Pakistani intrusion in Kashmir and its sponsorship of terrorism. He wanted nothing to do with Pakistan until the terrorists who perpetrated the carnage of Mumbai in November 2008 were brought to book; and, he graphically contrasted the United Progressive Alliance government’s “softness” towards Pakistan with verbal images of beheaded Indian soldiers who were victims of Pakistan’s brutality. Famously, he eloquently derided a government that offered succulent biryani to Pakistani leaders even while Indian soldiers were being beheaded on the border.
Well, neither have the terrorist camps been wound down in Pakistan, nor have the perpetrators of Mumbai been brought to book, and nor has cross-border terrorism in J&K ceased. The proclamation of Mr Modi not to have anything to do with Pakistan until past grievances were redressed stood exposed, notwithstanding Mr Sharif’s presence at the Rashtrapati Bhavan forecourt, or his gift of a sari for Mr Modi’s mother. Nor did this premature bonhomie prove efficacious in changing Pakistani behaviour. In fact, even as Mr Sharif dined with Mr Modi on biryani or perhaps dhokla, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba’s role in the attack on the Indian consulate in Herat, Afghanistan, was starkly on display.
The important point, therefore, is that foreign policy needs to be rescued from the realm of well intentioned ad hoc cosmetics and imbedded in the hard world of real politics. Thus far Pakistan has perfected a policy of explosive aggression and tactical appeasement. The need of the hour is for India to devise a cohesive policy framework that anticipates both. There is no harm in talks or negotiations or other forms of engagement so long as we see them as the means to an end of our own making.
Both with Pakistan and China, foreign policy outcomes are linked with the state of our defence preparedness. This is especially the case with China. China can move 30 divisions (half a million troops) to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India within a month, outnumbering Indian soldiers in that area of operation 3:1. It has built up its infrastructure on the Tibetan border — 3,000 kilometres of new highways, 1,956 kilometres of railroad, the 1,080-kilometre-long Golmud-Lhasa pipeline, and several airfields. Our border infrastructure does not even begin to compare. Even the Army’s proposal to create a China-focused mountain strike corps consisting of a military brigade for Uttarakhand and two armoured brigades for Ladakh and Sikkim, is yet to be actualised. There are numerous such examples of yawning holes in the country’s defences when it comes to China and Pakistan.
Mr Modi must, therefore, rescue foreign policy from the outdated prism of routine ceremonial and develop a clear-cut, unequivocal and well-thought-out security doctrine incorporating both foreign policy and defence. In doing so he would be well advised to revisit Chanakya and his four tools of sama, dama, danda, bheda — conciliation, inducement, deterrent action and subversion — and the lesser known asana, or the strategic art of deliberately sitting on the fence.
The sharing of gifts, ceremonial invitations and the partaking of biryani will make sense only if such a revamped and effective security doctrine is in place. Foreign policy requires strategic agility, not undue haste. If this is not remembered, hasty feel-good gestures will continue to prevail, and nothing would have really changed from the past.
Author-diplomat Pavan K. Varma’s latest book is Chanakya’s New Manifesto: To Resolve the Crisis Within India
