Whatever the future holds for the so-called Islamic State, which occupies considerable territory in Iraq and Syria, the gruesome murder of a captured Jordanian pilot by burning him in a cage, represents a further stage in the barbarity of an outfit that evolved out of the Al Qaeda and is seeking legitimacy in the name of Islam. An America that was seeking to un-entangle itself from West Asia has been forced to return to the area.
It is indeed strange that in a few short years the promise of the Arab Spring should have given way to an atmosphere of desperation in which the future of a whole region is on auction. Alignments are shifting around two groupings led by Saudi Arabia and Iran, with Turkey feeling somewhat isolated and the main outside powers led by the US engaged in fire-fighting operations.
Everyone is agreed that there are no quick-fix solutions to a region possessing more than its share of autocratic rulers, the countries’ oil wealth acting as both a wealth producer and a source of conflict, the Shia-Sunni schism a fault line and any number of outside powers more than willing to fish in troubled waters. What is new is that with the advent of the ISIS, the game is getting brutal by the day and the fear is that, whatever a country’s objectives, everyone is fated to lose.
Apart from the legacy of adventure by the European powers, replaced by the US in the post-World War II era, the main regional players themselves have contributed to the present impasse. It must, however, be acknow-ledged that the present predicament can be sourced to the unwise American invasion of Iraq. President George W. Bush was lured by the romantic idea of remaking West Asia.
The immediate objective of President Bush in dethroning Saddam was easily achieved, but the consequences of the invasion are very much still with us. Inevitably, other actors have jumped in. Osama bin Laden led one kind of opposition to become a central hate figure for the West. There were other ambitious actors. The King of Saudi Arabia, the leader of the rich Sunni Gulf monarchies, discovered to his discomfiture that most of the perpetrators of the New York 9/11 attacks were Saudis. Saudi rulers have considered it their duty to spread Islam around the world.
For non-Arab Turkey, the original objective was to assert its influence through diplomacy. Ironically, the first intention of its project came in proclaiming that it wished to have “zero problems” with neighbours. At the same time, it mounted a campaign to dethrone Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, a goal in which the West was supportive. But the President proved more resilient than anticipated, and the opposing forces were divided, poorly trained and motivated and the number of jihadis Turkey freely let into Syria soon took over the main attacks on the Syrian regime. They consisted of Al Qaeda factions and soon morphed into ISIS.
In Iraq, the long-time Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, was at work in inviting mayhem. He proved totally partisan in promoting the cause of the Shia to the distress of the Sunni, under President Hussein’s rule the top dogs. In a sense, Mr Maliki gave the disaffected Sunni all the reasons to join with the Al Qaeda factions to fight the new rulers. The US could help dethrone Mr Maliki only rather recently, after he had done all the harm.
Against this background, where do the West, the regional actors and the major outside powers go? In immediate terms, the US and its Western allies can only do more of the same. At the same time, Washington has no choice but to embrace Egypt, despite the coup that displaced the first elected President in Egyptian history; in fact, the tap of military aid was never closed. (A similar logic has led President Obama to propose an assistance of $1 billion to Pakistan for “strategic” reasons.)
Given the scale of the threat posed by the ISIS, Saudi Arabia is trying to moderate somewhat its proselytising activities abroad while Turkey is trying to be more discriminating in letting jihadis go through. These steps will not change the picture radically. The US objective has shifted somewhat in giving priority to fighting the ISIS, rather than getting rid of President Assad.
There is also the project to arm the moderate Syrian opposition, reversing earlier caution in view of fears that arms would go to jihadis. These actions are not earth-shaking and prove that the stated US objective to degrade and destroy the jihadi state can only be a long-term proposition. In the short term, the world is likely to see more killings and efforts by regional rulers to save their heads.
