The Naga Agreement, concluded in New Delhi on August 3, and described as a “framework agreement” and even as a “preamble”, holds more than one lesson as to how a government should not deal with an insurgency. An ethnic Naga movement was launched in 1918 with the formation of a Naga Club by 20 Naga members of the French Labour Corps who had served in World War I in Europe. A parallel is the Reading Room Party which Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah founded in Srinagar. Political parties were banned by the Dogra ruler, Hari Singh.
In 1929, the Club submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission which asserted that the Nagas had nothing in common with the people of India and should be left alone. In 1946, the Naga National Council (NNC) was formed under the leadership of A.Z. Phizo. Phizo and some other Nagas declared Naga Independence on August 14, 1947 — a day ahead of In-dia’s Independence Day.
There followed, in the usual style, accords which sought to stem the tide and failed because they did not respond to people’s wishes. First came the ambiguously worded accord between the governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydari, and the Naga National Council. Each side interpreted it differently. Some NNC members entered into the Shillong Agreement in 1975, the very year incidentally in which Sheikh Abdullah signed the accord with then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, paving the way for his return to power.
In both cases, the accords triggered fierce opposition. Two members of the NNC who alleged a “sell-out”, Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chishi Swu, set up the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. Another member, S.S. Khaplang, split in 1988 to form NSCN (Khaplang) opposing the NSCN (Isak-Muivah). A ceasefire followed in 1997 which Mr Khaplang unilaterally called off on March 27 this year. His cadres ambushed and killed 18 Indian soldiers on June 4. In retaliation Indian soldiers crossed the border into Myanmar, five days later, for “a surgical strike” at a Khaplang camp, which led some in New Delhi to flex their muscles and make claims of military prowess.
The August 3 accord was a rushed job. Mr Muivah is the general secretary of the NSCN (I-M). Its president, 85-year-old Isak Chishi Swu, signed it on a hospital bed in New Delhi. None of the CMs of the neighbouring states — Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur — was consulted. Nor was Union home minister Rajnath Singh. The deal was put through by the last of the Centre’s interlocutors, R.N. Ravi, of the Intelligence Bureau. The text was not published.
Three major issues yet remain to be resolved. One is the NSCN (I-M)’s claim for “Greater Nagaland”. Of the three million Nagas, nearly two million reside in Nagaland. The rest are dispersed in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Myanmar and most of all in Manipur (6,50,000). Manipur has resolutely refused to yield any territory. A likely solution is autonomous councils in Naga areas. The second issue is the surrender of arms. Who will supervise the surrender? And, how will the armed cadres of the NSCN (I-M) be rehabilitated?
The last will pose a serious problem. It is the Nagas’ self-assertion. In a statement issued immediately after the accord was signed, Mr Muivah said: “Beginning from now, challenges will be great,” adding a “framework agreement has been concluded basing on the unique history of the Nagas and recognising the universal principle that in a democracy, sovereignty lies with the people.”
Rh Raising, the “home minister” of the NSCN (I-M)’s “government of the People’s Republic of Nagalim”, the third in the hierarchy, said on August 5, “We the Nagas will co-exist with the Indian people according to the political agreement that was reached last Monday, and not according to the Indian Constitution.”
He obviously lays little store by Article 371-A of the Indian Constitution which says: “Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, (a) no act of Parliament in respect of (i) religion or social practices of the Nagas, (ii) Naga customary law and procedure, (iii) administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law, (iv) ownership and transfer of land and its resources, shall apply to Nagaland unless the legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides.”
Likewise, Kashmiris pour scorn on Article 370 which, though denuded, is under attack by the Bharatiya Janata Party. But Kashmir’s leaders do not face the harsh truth: why did New Delhi feel compelled to talk to the Naga leaders, for years in Bangkok and The Hague? It is because they wielded clout on the ground. In contrast, the leaders of Kashmir’s separatist movement present a sorry picture.
The writer is an author and lawyer based in Mumbai
By arrangement with Dawn
