The wise men have spoken — the moot point is, will they be heard? The committee of experts appointed by the ministry of defence (MoD) to advise it on “amendment to Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2013, including formulation of policy framework”, has submitted its report — and for a change, the MoD has hosted it on its website for wide publicity. The committee’s task was to suggest remedial measures to achieve the national aim of transforming the arms procurement environment, from one which has bred 70 per cent import dependency to one that helps metamorphose procurements into drivers of defence indigenisation.
The committee members were from the government, senior procurement specialists from the armed forces, a senior Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) scientist and the head of the defence vertical from the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) — one would find it hard to fault the composition. While many recommendations about changing or modifying the “nuts and bolts” of DPP 2013 have been made in the voluminous report, this piece examines macro issues having a direct bearing on the government’s efforts.
The committee report starts by acknowledging the primacy of the political executive in all decision-making but adds that “...in the choice of defence equipment, the armed forces must have the final say.” This is a resounding acceptance of the primacy of professional evaluation of equipment by the Services and their subsequent recommendations; it also puts in place “armchair” strategists who, without any responsibility, decry and attempt to discredit professionals, and sometimes a whole Service, as seen recently in l’affaire Rafale.
Secondly, the committee minces no words regarding its assessment of the current DPP 2013 when it states that “a tectonic shift is required in defence procurement procedures.” This is a virtual no-confidence in the present scheme of things and it goes on to recommend three areas, which it calls “prime vectors”, that need redressal: policy, procedures and institutions. Thus, it’s not just the policy framework that’s faulted but also the web of rules and regulations that are assessed as being responsible for the present sorry state. To add to the muddle, the institutions which are to implement policy and procedures too require a tectonic overhaul.
Following from these baseline observations, the committee recommends remedial measures starting with the setting up of a facilitation mechanism to maintain “two-way communication” with the private industry, including the micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Acknowledging that there needs to be close coordination between the DRDO and private industry in “Make in India” projects, the committee advocates that in some categories the private sector could be in the lead with the DRDO in support, and vice versa — this remarkable suggestion requires a leap of faith on the part of the government as it acknowledges the fact that the private industry can be an equal partner even when it comes to large and technologically intensive projects, hitherto the preserve of the DRDO.
One major crib of the private players has been the opaqueness of the requirements of Services, which precludes any advance planning by the industry. Accepting this, the next major recommendation is that the tri-Service Technology Perspective Capability Road Map that is shared with the industry must be made more open by expounding in detail the nature of systems required in the next 15 years. Private players can then plan their finances and, more importantly, acquire skilled human resource accordingly.
The last three recommendations are path-breaking and their non-acceptance will make the whole exercise stillborn. The committee has asked that, following laid-down criteria, private players be chosen to be strategic partners (SPs) in research and development (R&D) and manufacturing in six niche sectors like aircraft, warships and armoured fighting vehicles. These SPs would create capability and capacity over and above that in the defence public sector undertakings and would be part of the MoD teams during discussions with foreign suppliers. This would be sacrilege to many hard-boiled bureaucrats and technocrats, but if there was ever the proverbial “affirmative action or positive discrimination”, then this is it!
The penultimate recommendation is the setting up of a Procurement Executive outside the structure of the MoD, with all relevant specialists staffing it with long terms, including full-time tenures. Ay present, it is a situation of Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram where continuity and institutional knowledge, so vital in costly procurement, are the first casualties. The ownership of the procurement process thus devolves to the Procurement Executive, and if this recommendation is not accepted, then the rest is all hot air!
But there is one last counsel, nay, an exhortation by the committee which notes that “over the years, trust has taken a beating”. It beseeches for bi-partisan political support for defence procurement in matters nuclear and space by observing that “internal social divisions and the structure of Indian polity is such that there are continuous internal confrontations” and “that it’s only in time of crisis and war that everyone comes together, unfortunately to relapse into business as usual once the crisis abates. Unless a national consensus develops and an institutional framework put in place, adequate military power will not be generated.”
There can be no truer truth, as only when decision makers are supported for their honest professional decisions will defence indigenisation take place.
Can one hope for this?
The writer, a retired Air Vice-Marshal, is a distinguished fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi
