With that one surprise stop-over at Nawaz Sharif's family estate at Raiwind near Lahore on Christmas Day, and the weeks of top-level meetings preceding it — in Paris (Modi-Nawaz meeting), Bangkok (India-Pak NSAs meeting) and Islamabad (Foreign minister Sushma Swaraj's visit) — Prime Minister Narendra Modi has undoubtedly made Pakistan his major foreign policy preoccupation through 2016. He has embarked on the ambitious and dangerous road of completely transforming the India-Pakistan relationship. As he told the military services commanders at their combined conference last month, "We are engaging Pakistan to try and turn the course of history, build peaceful relations, advance cooperation and promote stability and prosperity in the region."
Modi gave an indication of his approach and vision when he invited Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, along with other Saarc leaders, to his oath taking ceremony in May 2014. It is no longer in public memory but the Lashkar-e-Toiba, which is more or less controlled by the Pakistan army, through the ISI, almost spoiled Modi's party by attacking the Indian consulate in Herat, Afghanistan. Many in India applauded Nawaz Sharif for showing the courage to accept the invitation despite the reservations of his military generals.
Modi has persevered in his approach despite the setbacks in the relationship in 2014 and 2015. In doing so, he has shown what is euphemistically called, in diplomatic jargon, flexibility. In common parlance, the equivalent word is concessions.
In July last year, at their meeting in Ufa in Russia, Modi and Sharif decided that the bilateral dialogue would be resumed after a round of meetings devoted to terrorism and eliminating tensions and firing along the International Border and the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani generals rejected this approach. They insisted that the talks should also be on J&K and the future of the dialogue. India did not accept the 'veto' in August, but in December it did. Consequently, the meeting of the Indian and Pakistani National Security Advisers was held in Bangkok in early December. India had shown flexibility both on the venue and the agenda. Has this only whetted the appetite of the generals? Do the generals think of flexibility as a sign of statesmanship, or of weakness to be exploited further?
NSA Ajit Doval and Foreign Secretary Jaishankar accompanied Modi to partake of Sharif's hospitality at his personal home at Jati Umra. High Commissioner Raghavan, who returned to India after retiring on December 31, was able to reach Raiwind despite the short notice. On the Pakistan side, Foreign Secretary Aizaz Choudhry, it is said, just happened to be in Lahore and was present at Raiwind. The surprising omission was Pakistan NSA Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Nasser Janjua. The clarification given is merely that he could not make it in time. The question is - why could he not? Was this a signal from the generals?
Certainly, the generals would have followed Modi's Kabul visit thoroughly and in real-time. In his excellent address to the joint session of the Afghan Parliament on the occasion of the dedication ceremony of the Indian-built Parliament building, Modi did not name Pakistan but he did clearly point to it. His reference to the "mysterious" consulates would have hurt the generals. What would have most certainly angered them were his words, "Afghanistan will only succeed when terrorism no longer flows across the border, when nurseries and sanctuaries of terrorism are shut and their patrons are no longer in business."
Jaishankar will travel in mid-January to Islamabad to meet his Pakistani counterpart to work out the modalities of the newly established Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue (CBD). In the normal course, it was the turn of the Pakistan Foreign Secretary to travel to Delhi. Obviously that is not happening to bypass the Hurriyat meeting issue. This is yet another sign of flexibility.
The traditional Pakistani focus has been on the resolution of outstanding issues, not on promoting cooperation or addressing humanitarian concerns. The generals are especially focused on Siachen and J&K. Pakistan longs to see Indian forces withdraw from their posts on the Saltoro heights. While earlier India was prepared to consider this if Pakistan was willing to authenticate the coordinates of the Indian and Pakistani posts and the Actual Ground Position Line, now the almost unanimous Indian view is that Indian forces should not withdraw from their posts. This is because of Chinese activities in Gilgit and Baltistan, and a sharper understanding of the strategic value of the region.
Will Pakistan allow any effective movement on matters relating to the lives of people, such as trade, agriculture and industrial cooperation and on humanitarian matters? If they do, that would indicate the beginnings of fresh thinking in Rawalpindi. There is no sign of such fresh thinking as yet, however. The real issue is, will the generals change their thinking on India. They hold India to be an eternal threat, a permanent enemy.
In order to meet the India challenge, they rely on their nuclear arsenal as well as terrorism, the latter having become an inherent part of their security doctrine. Unless they are willing to bring about a basic change in this approach, they cannot be Modi's partners on the road to "turn the course of history". Modi will travel to Pakistan this year for the Saarc summit. He should be aware that even ambitious leaders should be cautious. Cleo, the goddess of history, may spring an unwelcome surprise if pushed too hard.
(The writer is a career diplomat who retired as Secretary (West) in the Ministry of External Affairs. He served as Ambassador to Afghanistan, Myanmar and Thailand)
