A Sino-India high five

The loud signal coming from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India is that his country will work on two parallel trajectories, economic and political, and the two will diverge and sometimes converge. To underline this message, the choreographed stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in Ladakh coinciding with President Xi’s presence was an instant reminder that Beijing is far ahead of New Delhi in economic and brute military muscle.

However, President Xi’s visit must be classed as a qualified success because there is substantial content in the new economic relationship projected — to the tune of $20 billion in investment over five years — and there seems to be a new recognition on the Chinese side that the lop-sided nature of the present trade relationship is not viable.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi showed his guest unique courtesies — courtesies he had been shown by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his recent trip to Japan — by hosting President Xi in his home state of Gujarat. That the two leaders, in their interactions in Ahmedabad and New Delhi, got to know each other better is a good outcome for their future dealings.

President Xi promised to resolve the border issue at an early date without setting a time frame even as umpteen rounds of talks between the two countries’ special representatives have led nowhere and the Chinese leader himself pointed to the undemarcated nature of the border.

Mr Modi then publicly spelled out the route to progress: get down to delineating the Line of Actual Control, something Beijing has been fighting shy of.
On the economic side, there were plenty of ideas and proposals. Two Chinese industrial parks, one in Gujarat and another in Maharashtra, will be set up. China will help modernise and improve the speed of the lumbering Indian Railways. In fact, a total of 13 agreements were signed.

President Xi had brought with him a sweetener: the opening of a new land route to Mansarovar for the annual pilgrimage that would make the journey smoother and immune to climate vagaries, scoring an emotional triumph.

The Chinese side on the other hand received some comfort from a more sympathetic Indian reaction to what it had set its heart upon: a land route linking China with Burma and eastern India.
There were disappointments too for the Chinese. Two of their major wishes were far from being fulfilled: the bullet train and nuclear cooperation.

On the question of bullet trains, New Delhi is understandably treading warily on committing itself to a Chinese role, in view of Japan being way ahead in studying the Mumbai-Ahmedabad route for a first venture and is a major fund-giver of the Delhi Metro project. Besides, Tokyo has promised investments worth $35 billion in India in the next five years.

As far as nuclear cooperation with China, the promise is only to begin studying the issue. Here again, there is the Japanese equation. Tokyo has still to surmount its unique inhibitions on cooperating with a country not signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the hurdle of the problematic nature of suppliers’ obligations legislated by the Indian Parliament.

There is recognition in New Delhi that the relationship with China, essential as it is, is a complicated one, given the Indian debacle in the 1962 war, the nature of the land boundary dispute and the vast disparities between the two countries after China’s phenomenal economic and military progress over the last three decades.

It is no secret that India’s geopolitical options consist of a three-way balancing of relations among Japan, China and the United States.
In fact, Mr Modi will complete the third point of the triangle soon with his planned visit to the United States and his meetings with President Barack Obama in Washington.

What has emerged thus far is a recognition by Beijing and Washington that India has a decisive leader with a clear parliamentary majority one can do business with. In China’s case, with President Xi projected to be in the presidency for the next nine years after quickly amassing power in the Politburo and the military, he is in a singular position to chart a new course in Sino-Indian relations (erroneously referred to as Indo-Chinese relations, Indochina being an old French colony).

Similarly, President Obama seems to be looking forward to dealing with Mr Modi, despite the denial of a US visa in the past, in a relationship that seems to have been neglected during much of his presidency. Obviously, India has to rank high in his declared “pivot” to Asia, if only the President can get away from his preoccupations and new military plans in West Asia.

President Xi has come across during his Indian visit as a more flexible man than his predecessor and, given the power he has amassed in the Chinese structure, he has much greater ability to change Beijing’s policies on all fronts.

But Beijing’s geopolitical vision is expansive and although President Xi is willing to do business with India, given its size and importance, China is very conscious of its own superior stature.
On the other hand, the point Mr Modi has been making, explicitly and otherwise, is that the two countries need each other equally and any concept of building an Asian century is dependent on an amicable understanding between the two.

Beijing well knows that Japan exercises an equal spell on Mr Modi and his first official visit outside the subcontinent was to Japan.
On the other hand, China was quick on the uptake and sent a special high-level representa-tive to Delhi to call on Mr Modi as a gesture of its special regard for the new Prime Minister and desire to engage with him. And Mr Modi has handsomely paid off that gesture by the manner in which he has hosted his high Chinese guest.

In one respect, there has been progress of sorts. Mr Modi has been quite frank in spelling out his concerns on Chinese policies along the border and elsewhere. The less diplomatese there is in Sino-Indian relations, the better for the future relationship.