Prime Minister's power trip

Civilian nuclear cooperation was an important item on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s agenda during his brisk summit-level diplomacy in September. The outcome of his discussions on this crucial subject with four world leaders was not particularly encouraging. The only exception was a clear-cut agreement signed during the visit to New Delhi of the Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, under which Australia will sell uranium to this country. This will be a welcome addition to the countries already supplying this fuel, such as Russia, Canada, Namibia, Mongolia and Kazakhstan.

On the far more important issue of importing reactors that are of greater capacity and higher quality than we have currently, however, there was little progress. Come to think of it, since 2008, when the India-America nuclear deal rescued us from “nuclear apartheid” to which we were subjected for four decades, not a single foreign reactor has yet come in. Ironically, this is so despite our promise to the United States at that time to import American reactors that would produce 10,000 MW of nuclear power. It is no secret that the Obama administration — which has plenty of “non-proliferation ayatollahs” in its ranks — is displeased with India on this score. After all, the Indian nuclear power industry is worth the whopping amount of $150 billion.

But let’s return to the hurdles to agreements on nuclear reactor imports, beginning with the September negotiations. At the beginning of last month, Mr Modi went to Kyoto and Tokyo to meet his opposite number and admirer, Shinzo Abe. The rest of the visit was productive, but on a civilian nuclear cooperating agreement, which the two countries have been discussing since 2010, there could be no progress at all — Mr Abe’s popularity ratings have plummeted because he has allowed the restarting of Japanese nuclear power stations closed since the Fukushima disaster. His reasoning is sound. Japan just cannot meet its energy needs without nuclear power, and he has assured his countrymen of the reactors’ total safety. But the anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan is overwhelming. Consequently, it is unrealistic to expect nuclear cooperation with friendly Japan any time soon.

Given this background, it is both interesting and ironic that China’s President, Xi Jinping, whose visit turned bruising because of the simultaneous military standoff in Ladakh, offered civilian nuclear cooperation to this country. Mr Modi’s courteous reply to him was that two countries will enter into talks on this. But Indian experts have several reservations about nuclear partnership with China. Though China has had no accident in its burgeoning nuclear industry, yet foreigners engaged with China in the nuclear arena say that its “track record” in nuclear safety has not been good. This, however, is a minor matter compared with Beijing’s persistent and consistent veto of India’s membership of the Vienna-based Nuclear Suppliers Group, coupled with its generous nuclear help to Pakistan.  

After saying goodbye to Mr Xi, the Prime Minister flew to Washington, via New York, for a rendezvous with President Barrack Obama. Despite the hype about the big success of his five-day visit to the US, the only thing the joint statement by the two leaders said on nuclear cooperation was that they would set up a suitable mechanism to sort this matter out. The real problem, however, is that America takes strong objection to India’s Nuclear Liability law that places responsibility for a nuclear disaster not only on the operator but also on the supplier of equipment. Moreover, even a “third party” can drag the supplier to a court of law. To a large extent these objections are shared by the friendlier suppliers, such as Rosatom of Russia and Areva of France. However, the expectation is that these two sources would be more amenable to a compromise.

Unfortunately, Japan’s inability or unwillingness to reach a nuclear cooperation agreement with India adds to our difficulties with the US, too. For, one of the two major American suppliers, Westinghouse (the other being General Electric), is Japanese-owned. Many Indians argue that if Westinghouse can do business with China and South Korea, why cannot it supply reactors to this country? Tokyo’s answer is that both Beijing and Seoul have singed the NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty); New Delhi hasn’t and will not.

This underscores how hard the task of persuading potential suppliers of nuclear reactors is going to be because chances of Indian Parliament diluting the Nuclear Liability law are very slim, and America’s assumption that the responsibility of the suppliers can be reduced under the contracts is untenable. Yet, however difficult the task ahead, it has to be completed speedily and imaginatively. For, India badly needs nuclear power on a large scale and in good time. We possess one of the largest reservoirs of coal and have made a mess of coal-based power. The country is totally opposed to hydro-power. Solar power and wind power can at best supplement other sources of power but not fill the huge gap. That can be done only by nuclear power.

Luckily Mr Modi knows this. Otherwise he would not have urged the Atomic Energy Commission to “triple” the current production — of 5,780 MW of nuclear power — by 2023. The target for 2032 is 63,000 MW. After all, he has promised to supply electricity to every Indian home 24x7. Within a very short time after assuming power he also ratified the additional protocol of the  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), so as to make it easy to negotiate with suppliers to do so. This stupendous objective would require the installation during the next decade of at least 40 light water power reactors of at least 1,000 MW capacity each.
We cannot be so slow and lazy as we were in the case of the two Russian reactors (one has yet to go critical) at Kudankulam. The agreement for these was signed in 1988 but the elementary steps to build them were taken in 2002.