Battling the CrISIS

From early August to mid-October there have been nearly 550 air strikes by coalition forces in Iraq, while Syria has experienced over 15,000 strikes from September 23 to October 15. And yet, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), targeted by this fierce fire power, continues its occupation and even expansion of territory in both Iraq and Syria. A critic of US intervention, James Russell, has described the US as “careening” through the region, “dispensing bombs, money and political fealty”, while its allies remain fickle and untrustworthy, and focus on agendas that are different from US priorities.

Turkish concerns
The siege of the town of Kobane has dramatically exposed the faultlines in the US-led coalition. This town in the Kurdish area of Syria’s border with Turkey has been besieged by ISIS forces since September 16. Nearly 200,000 Kurdish refugees have entered Turkey, while the remaining population is threatened with genocide if the ISIS takes over the town. Here, the complicated interests of the regional players have manifested themselves. Turkey’s principal concern is that the main Kurdish force in Syria is the Democratic Union Party (PYD); it is affiliated to the domestic Kurdish party, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has waged a long and bloody campaign against the Turkish state over several decades. Though it has for now abandoned its secessionist aspirations, the Kurdish issue remains the prism through which Turkey views regional developments.

There is a further complication: the Assad government has for the last few years backed the PYD, primarily as a balancing force against Turkey. Hence, in the current imbroglio, Turkey has felt its interests are better served by giving priority to regime change in Damascus rather than to the fight against the ISIS. Accordingly, as pre-conditions for its participation in the coalition, it has insisted on the establishment of a no-fly zone for the Syrian air force and a buffer zone on its border with Syria, going 40 km into Syrian territory, where the Kurdish refugees and rebel fighters would be accommodated.

On Monday, October 20, in a sudden turn-around, Turkey announced that it would permit supply of weapons to the beleaguered Kurdish forces in Kobane and the movement of Kurdish soldiers from Iraq into Syria. Since this decision followed a telephonic conversation between Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Barack Obama, there is speculation that the US has accepted most if not all of Turkey’s demands.

However, the longer term implications of this intervention have perhaps not been considered: for instance, if Turkish troops were to threaten to topple the Assad regime, it is unlikely that Iran will stand on the sidelines and allow its strategic partner to be removed. Again, the siege of Kobane already has some special significance for the Kurds: their brave stand against the ISIS over several weeks is being seen as a symbol of Kurdish resistance and a “defining moment of nationhood and identity”. This could later on complicate Turkish efforts to contend with Kurdish nationalism and aspirations for statehood.

Absence of a strategy
It is obvious that the ongoing military action has not been framed in a broader strategy; there is simply no consensus among the coalition partners on what their core interests are. The US is clear that its principal targets are the jihadi elements, represented by the Al Qaeda, its affiliate in Syria Jabhat Nusra, and the ISIS. However, the US’s Gulf Arab partners have other interests: given that their priority is regime change in Damascus, they see Jabhat Nusra as a potent force against the Assad regime.

Again, the decision of the coalition partners to prepare local forces for ground action against the ISIS is beset with grave uncertainties. In Iraq, the development of a modern, professional, non-sectarian force would require a more accommodative political environment that the country has not witnessed in over 10 years. Developing such a force in Syria will be even more difficult since the country already has several hundred competing militia; sharp battle lines have been drawn on the basis of sectarian affiliations, while the Arab Gulf countries are robustly backing Salafi militia which are closely associated with jihadi elements.

Most commentators recognise that the ISIS will be finally defeated only through ground action. The White House remains totally opposed to any such misadventure, while the Gulf Arabs fear inflaming domestic opinion, large sections of which continue to be sympathetic to the ideology and aspirations of the ISIS. In fact, recent surveys have revealed deep concerns among Gulf Arabs about the cost of the war which will be paid for from their countries’ coffers, the fact that Iran could be the major beneficiary in the conflict, and uncertainties relating to the post-war scenario.

Regional competitions

Besides the political and military problems on the ground, two competitions further complicate the West Asian scenario. First, there is the nascent rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This is centred on the support that Turkey, allied with Qatar, extends to the forces of political Islam represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, which is anathema for the Saudis. The competition between different political visions of Sunni Islam will intensify over time and West Asia will be the battleground as the Wahhabiya of Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood and the jihadi forces represented by Al Qaeda and its offshoots, fight for space, minds and hearts in the Islamic world.

However, the more immediate confrontation remains the one between Saudi Arabia and Iran which has sectarian and strategic connotations. The Kingdom perceives an existential threat for itself in a West Asia that in its view is overwhelmingly under Iranian influence. The most recent challenge for Saudi Arabia is the dominant role now being played by the Iran-influenced Shia Houthi group in Yemen, giving the Kingdom the sense of being encircled by hostile sectarian forces.

Amidst these competitions and confrontations, it is very likely that the US-led coalition will be sucked deeper into the West Asian quagmire, even as the Islamic State consolidates itself as a military, political and economic force.

The author is the former Indian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE