Remembering 1965: 50 years after the war

Under Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s delusion and misadventure

Pakistan’s Army under the country’s first military dictator, self-promoted Field Marshal Ayub Khan, was feeling very heady with a large package of arms from the United States and under the delusion that after the 1962 Sino-Indian war the Indian Army was weak, launched its second war against India.

Over some failed skirmishes beginning with the one in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 and Jammu and Kashmir, in barely three weeks, from 28 August to 22 September 1965, following some fierce actions and large tank battles fought for the first time since the Second World War, Pakistan’s losses were 3,800 personnel killed, over 400 tanks destroyed or captured, over 40 aircraft shot down and a deep drop in the morale of its forces. The Indian Army captured Haji Pir, reached Lahore, captured Phillora and created Patton Nagar, a graveyard of almost 100 destroyed tanks at Khem Karan.  

Pakistan’s leading English daily, Dawn, on September 6, 2005 carried a comment: “…the 1965 war also led to an embargo of US arms supplies to Pakistan. Islamabad’s use of American arms against India was against the assurances given by President Dwight Eisenhower to Jawaharlal Nehru that in case Pakistan used US-supplied arms against India, necessary corrective action would follow. Though the US bureaucracy and the Pentagon were prepared to look the other way if Pakistan had won the war, they found it difficult to overlook the miserable performance of Pakistani armour at Khem Karan”.

In the same newspaper, Air Marshal Nur Khan (Retd), who was chief of the Pakistan Air Force during this war and one who was kept in the dark about Operation ‘Gibraltar, was quoted as saying: “It was a wrong war. And they misled the nation with a big lie that India had provoked the war and that we were the victims of Indian aggression”.

Interestingly, the regiment which destroyed the maximum number of enemy tanks — 79 (mostly newly-acquired Pattons from the US) and 17 recoilless guns with World War II vintage Centurions — was Hodson’s Horse, in which, incidentally, Ayub Khan’s father, Risaldar Major Mir Dad Khan, also served. And even though Hodson’s Horse was pitched into the 1965 war almost four and a half decades after World War I in which it fought as a horse cavalry unit, fighting with World War II vintage Centurion tanks, it displayed its typical fierce fighting spirit.

Two clear armour-piercing shots (above) on the turret of a Pakistani Sherman tank at the Hodson’s gunnery in Thakurdwara

Some outstanding facts about Hodson’s Horse in the 1965 war:

• It was the only regiment in which the CO’s tank destroyed four enemy tanks despite being hit four times and after having to bail out when the tank caught fire, the CO and his crew fought dismounted with small arms and evaded capture.
• Reacting swiftly to fast-changing situations, the regiment was also a classic example of armour turning the flank and destroying superior forces by skilful manoeuvre and surprise.
• Despite great odds on the ground like the enemy’s superior/newer tanks and lack of maps and other equipment, it moved to all required locations and fulfilled all tasks beyond higher commanders’ expectations.
• Outstanding bravery of all ranks, including some who died, some got severely wounded and some were disabled.

While Hodson’s Horse got 43 gallantry awards, a brief mention about some personnel is relevant. Actions by the tank crews of Lt. Col. M.M.S. Bakshi, Maj. Bhupinder Singh and many others reflect the fearlessness of fighting with cupolas open and not abandoning their tanks despite taking even four hits and bailing out only when the tanks actually caught fire. Pakistani tank crews bailed out on getting hit once, even if their tanks’ main guns and machine-guns were functional.

Lt. (later Colonel) Ashok Sodhi became a victim of Pakistani armour’s poor gunnery, when an armour-piercing round failed to hit the tank but grazed his skull, shattering a 3-inch diameter part of it. He was in coma in the Army Hospital in Delhi for over 30 days, after which he recovered with a fresh lease of life and a plate covering the shattered part of his skull. Lt. Charanjit Singh was killed by being hit in the head during air strafing. Capt. (later Brigadier) Jasbir Singh Hundal, the Reconnaissance Troop Leader, had many near misses while operating in an open jeep throughout the duration of the war. Lt (later Lt. Col.) S.C. Mathur, mentioned in dispatches for bravery,  an emergency commissioned officer then, received release orders during the war.

On a strong recommendation for his valour, he was eventually retained and granted a permanent commission. Capt (later Brigadier) Ravi Malhota, signal-cum-intelligence officer in Col. Bakshi’s tank, was recommended for the Vir Chakra, but got mentioned in dispatches. The only Vir Chakra for outstanding valour was Lance Dafadar Udham Singh, that too, posthumously. Maj. Desraj Urs, C Squadron Commander, lost sight in one eye in which he was hit by a shrapnel. Maj. K.S. Dhillon, a squadron commander, was severely wounded by shell splinters from a near miss while gallantly directing fire onto an enemy observation post (meant for directing artillery fire). He suffers from a severe permanent limp.

While Maj. Bhupinder Singh was admitted to the Army Hospital in Delhi Cantonment for severe burns, then Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri came to meet the war wounded. When the PM approached his bed, Maj. Singh expressed regret at not being able to salute him. Mr Shastri never forgot that experience and for the short while that he lived thereafter, he praised Maj. Singh often and widely. However, and quite typically again, Hodson’s Horse was most modest in projecting its achievements in this war.

Lal Bahadur Shastri, who went to Tashkent for the peace talks, ceded Haji Pir back to Pakistan. And then, very surprisingly and mysteriously, he died. The Congress government never insisted on a full investigation into the circumstances of his death and left little doubt in the minds of many that his death was not a coincidence.

Workers clean a Pakistani tank that was captured during the 1965 war before its display on the eve of the golden jubilee celebration of the war in New Delhi on Thursday (Photo: Pritam Bandyopadhyay)

Commander’s account

(Excerpt from the personal account of the battle of Phillora by Lt. Col. (later brig.) M.M.S. Bakshi, MVC, CO, 4 Horse)

By September 11 Hodson’s Horse had put a tight squeeze on Phillora. We were not only keeping the enemy’s Phillora defences fully engaged but also destroying everything falling back from the Gadgor defences. Meanwhile, 17 Horse had also fetched up from the direction of Libbe and made contact with Phillora from the south and south-west. Thus, our armour had virtually put a ring around Phillora, and threatened its life line to Chawinda. Just after midday, we intercepted an enemy wireless message. “We are pulling out from Chobara, Gadgor and Phillora. One of our units has been overrun at Gadgor, we are pulling back to Fatehpur”.

The enemy had evidently been unnerved. Not much of this force was, however, allowed to escape to Phillora as “A” squadron was lying in wait for it in area Wachoke-Saboke and decimated the bulk of its mobile elements moving by road. By 15.30 hours Phillora was taken by 17 Horse and 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade. Much booty was left behind by the enemy at Phillora. A jeep belonging to GOC 6 armoured division complete with his flag and star plates was captured intact. Besides a map lorry with a good stock of maps and the usual paraphernalia of a hurriedly-abandoned HQ was found littered all over. Thus, our problem of maps was solved for good.

In this battle 51 enemy tanks were destroyed by one armoured brigade, of which 4 (Hodon’s) Horse accounted for 27. Our brigade had suffered six tanks destroyed and nine damaged.
Other than my tank, we had no tank losses in 4 Horse, and none were seriously damaged. This was the first big day for the regiment and all the squadrons had done their job magnificently. For the enemy, it was a disaster of the first magnitude. Severely punished in his first big armour clash with us, his morale was so badly shaken that he gave up the fight for Phillora which could otherwise have been a tough nut to crack.

It was also a classic example of armour turning the flank and destroying superior forces by skilful manoeuvre and surprise. By delivering this crushing blow, we had established our moral ascendancy over the enemy to such an extent that from then on he fought shy of facing us with his armour in a mobile battle. In the days that followed he repeatedly abandoned his tanks as soon as our tanks challenged him to a duel. Many such tanks later fell into our hands intact.

Army personnel raising slogans near the T72 Tank during an event to mark the victory of 1965 Indo-Pak war in Jammu (Photo: AP)

Pak viewpoint

(Excerpt from an analysis by Brigadier Shaukat Qadir (Retd) on why Pakistan’s Operation Grand Slam failed)

Operation Grand Slam was one of a number of contingency plans that had been prepared to support Gibraltar... Since Gibraltar’s failure was considered inconceivable, this plan intended to sever the road link between India and Indian-held Kashmir once the Valley was up in flames. Now that Gibraltar had not just failed but resulted in the loss of some key posts in Kashmir, the operation was undertaken to relieve pressure on the troops defending Kashmir. Operation Grand Slam was four-phased; the capture of Chamb, the crossing of river Tawi and consolidation, followed by the capture of Akhnoor, and finally severing the Indian lines of communication and capturing Rajouri.

Risaldar Major Mir Dad Khan of Hodson’s Horse, who was the father of Pakistan’s first military dictator, self-promoted Field Marshal Ayub Khan

Despite the difficulties of terrain, specially entailing a river crossing, the possibility for success lay in the bold audacity of the plan, which necessitated speed in execution, since if there was sufficient time permitted to the Indians, they would reinforce Akhnoor and it would be impossible to capture... Perhaps if Akhnoor had been captured and the Indian lines of communication severed, the Indian attack on Sialkot could never have occurred! Perhaps. But that we will never know. What we do know is that Akhnoor was never captured and this led us into the attack on Lahore and later Sialkot in the wee hours of September 6 1965 ….

It is a matter of historical record that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister, convinced Ayub Khan, the president, that the Indian response to our incursions in Kashmir would not be across the international boundary and would be confined to Kashmir... Secondly, the undertaking of guerrilla operations necessitate special conditions, not only must the terrain be suitable, which it was, but there must be guaranteed local support, without which guerrilla operations are not sustainable. Preferably there should be a preliminary reconnaissance and liaison which sets the ground for such an operation.

For some obscure reason, Pakistan undertook Operation Gibraltar without preparing the grounds for it, or seeking guarantees of local support, or even attempting to assess the mood of the Kashmiri people. They only relied on the assessment offered by some adventurous element of Kashmiris from Azad Kashmir without verifying this assessment... Far from rising up in arms, the local population denied any support and, in many instances, handed over the infiltrators to Indian troops.

Bravehearts — citations

LT. COL. M.M.S. Bakshi (MVC)

On September 11, 1965, Hodson’s Horse commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Madan Mohan Singh Bakshi was assigned the task of protecting the left flank of Armoured Brigade during the Brigade’s attack on Phillora, as well as intercept enemy’s withdrawing armour astride the Gadgor-Phillora road. While the squadrons were in the process of moving up, regimental headquarters were reconnoitering a suitable position for the impending armoured battle. Lt. Col. Bakshi suddenly observed a squadron of enemy Patton tanks in hull down positions astride the Libbe-Phillora road. Without the slightest hesitation, he engaged and knocked out two enemy tanks. Soon after, the other tanks of the enemy squadron directed their guns on Lt. Col. Bakshi’s tank. Undeterred, Lt. Col Bakshi advanced again to charge through the enemy tanks, though he had by now received two direct hits on his tank. He gallantly charged with his single tank, crossed the road and knocked out another enemy tank. By now his tank had been hit for the fourth time and had caught fire, whereupon he ordered the crew to bail out. While doing so, Lt. Col Bakshi and his crew came under intense machine-gun fire and were also surrounded by the crew of enemy tanks. Lt. Col. Bakshi and his crew defied capture and took cover in an adjacent field, from where they were retrieved by the advancing tanks of 17 Horse. His inspiring leadership made a material contribution to the capture of Phillora.

Maj. Bhupinder Singh (MVC) posthumous

Maj. Bhupinder Singh led his squadron with distinction in the battle of Phillora and Sodroke. He remained continuously in action from September 11 to 19, 1965 and the tactical handling of his squadron was an example of which any armoured unit could well be proud. With skilful deployment and hold action his squadron, he was able to cause largescale destruction of enemy tanks and other equipment. In spite of his tank being hit several times he continued to remain in effective command and by several acts of personal gallantry setting an inspiring example for his men who fought magnificently. On September 19, 1965 in the battle of Sodreke, his tank was hit yet again and caught fire. While abandoning the tank he was severely burnt and evacuated to hospital. He showed commendable calm and steadfastness under fire and set an inspiring example of personal bravery in the best traditions of the Army.

Lance Dafadar Udham Singh (Vir Chakra) posthumous

During operations in Jassoran, when our infantry was under heavy enemy fire on September 22, 1965, Lance Dafadar Udham Singh decided to take his tank forward despite limited observation afforded by the terrain. Although his tank was caught in the cross-fire of enemy tanks, he succeeded in knocking out two enemy tanks. Meanwhile, his own tank was hit by the enemy and he was killed afterwards. His action, however, enabled the infantry to extricate itself from a difficult situation. In this action, LD Udham Singh displayed courage and devotion to duty which are in the best traditions of the Army.

Army personnel perform a drill during an event to mark the victory of 1965 Indo-Pak war in Jammu (Photo: AP)