View from Pakistan: Pakistan must regain Afghan trust

Karachi: Recently, I had the opportunity to attend a conference in Herat on the cultural and social aspects of security followed by a meeting on the latest developments in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. Herat is the only surviving city among the four centres of historical Khorasan. The others were Balkh (the home of Maulana Rumi,) Marv and Nishapur.

Herat is from where the two greatest saints of Islam in the subcontinent came: Hazrat al-Hujveri Data Ganj Baksh to Lahore in the ninth century and Hazrat Gharib Nawaz Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti to Ajmer in the 11th century. Under the Tahiri Sultanate, Herat was the successor of Baghdad as the most brilliant centre of Islamic civilisation. Its influence radiated in all directions: to Samarkand and China; to Nishapur and Constantinople (Istanbul) to Marv and Bokhara; to Mashhad, Kerman, Shiraz and Isfahan; and to Kashmir, Lahore, Ajmer and Delhi.

It has been described by Senator Afrasiab Khattak in a recent newspaper article. He is appropriately known as a “bridge-builder” between Afghanistan and Pakistan. His services are needed more than ever now. When Afghan President Ashraf Ghani chose Pakistan as the first country to visit after his election he was making a very bold statement. He was also taking a very significant risk. But he was determined to break out of the morass in which the relationship had sunk during the presidency of Hamid Karzai. To be fair to Karzai, he visited Pakistan around 20 times in an effort to develop a relationship of cooperation between “conjoined twins.”

Unfortunately, for a number of complex reasons, including the tunnel vision of the generally uneducated decision-makers, that effort completely failed. Ashraf Ghani was determined to bring the relationship out of this. Ghani acknowledged Pakistan’s pre-eminent role in brokering a peace between Kabul and Taliban. He was even willing to displease India  in order to cultivate cooperation with Pakistan. But he insisted Pakistan had to make a choice.

It had to decide who were its friends in Afghanistan: the elected government in Kabul or the Taliban? Pakistan apparently assured Ghani that as the elected leader of the Afghan people he was Pakistan’s choice as partner in Afghanistan. Ghani emphasised that if Pakistan did not live up to its undertaking his position in Afghanistan would be undermined. It seemed a new era of hope in relations between the two countries was about to dawn. Overnight, Ghani became one of the most popular leaders in Pakistan. High-level civil and military exchanges followed; joint counterterrorism operations were planned; and a MoU on intelligence sharing was signed between the ISI and the National Directorate of Security of Afghanistan. This, however, caused outrage in Afghanistan.

The ISI is seen as very bad news by most Afghans, Pakhtun and non-Pakhtun. The NDS is seen in Pakistan as a hotbed of “anti-Pakistan” sentiment and whose officers coordinate closely with advisers from India’s RAW. Moreover, both Afghan and Pakistani governments are seen as unable to stand up to hawkish pressures. Unsurprisingly, Tali-ban attacks not only continued but began to reach Kabul. The Afghans insist that without the availability of Pakistan’s territory the Taliban would be no match for the Afghan security forces. Pakistan argues the Taliban are “self-sufficient” inside Afghanistan as indicated by their targets which are located far from Pakistan. This is because the Taliban enjoy support in Afghanistan. Moreover, Ghani supposedly “overestimated” Pakistan’s influence on the Taliban and, accordingly, blamed Pakistan for every setback in Afghanistan. Finally, if Pakistan cut off all ties with the Taliban how would it be able to persuade them to come to the table?

The Afghan government rejects Pakistan’s arguments and insists a militarily strengthened and politically recalcitrant Taliban would not enter negotiations with Kabul on acceptable terms. Pakistan, allegedly, was playing its usual double game to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan despite Ghani’s assurances that he would never allow India to use Afghan territory against Pakistan. While Pakistan complained of attacks on targets in Pakistan that were planned in Afghanistan and asked Kabul to “do more” to stop them, it knew Kabul had little control over the border with Pakistan.

Nevertheless, Pakistan was able to arrange the Murree (or 2+1+2) talks in July which all sides pronounced a good beginning. But the mutual recrimination that followed the revelation of Mullah Omar’s death two years ago prevented a second round of talks. Instead, the Taliban offensive intensified culminating in deadly suicide bombings in Kabul and the temporary fall of Kunduz. An embarrassed Ghani alleged Pakistan was “at war” with Afghanistan and the relationship was no longer “brotherly.” He refused further Pakistani help in negotiations with the Taliban insisting it first deny its territory to them and their allies. The endorsement of Mullah Akhtar Mansur as Mullah Omar’s successor in Kuchlak, 24 kilometres from Quetta, confirmed Afghan suspicions about the role of Pakistan.

It must be admitted there are many Afghans, especially around Kandahar, who believe the Taliban will have to be included in a “transition” process. The majority, however, believes the Taliban can and must be isolated and weakened before any reconciliation process becomes feasible. They see “Pakistani duplicity” as the major obstacle. Ghani feels betrayed. He had warned Pakistan that if it let him down his political position would become untenable. A comprehensive Afghan policy review to restore mutual trust is, accordingly, an urgent priority.

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, India and China and head of UN missions in Iraq and Sudan

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