‘Witness To Surrender’ spotlights Pakistan’s terminal fear of Northeast’s long border with Bangladesh

The terminal fear of Pakistan of Bangladesh’s long border on three sides with the Northeast of India and the strength of ‘Bangla nationalism’ set the backdrop for ‘Witness to Surrender’ by Siddiq Salik.

“We brought out the book of the deceased Siddiq Salik amid renewed interests in the strategic spheres. Salik, a Major with the Pakistani Army, had overseen the last two years leading to the surrender by Lt. Gen. AAK Niazi to the eastern command of the Indian Army. He gives vivid accounts of the failed bid of Pakistan’s politico-military ecosystem to crush Bangla nationalism spearheaded by Awami League,” Pankaj P Singh, editor of the publisher – The Browser -- told this newspaper.

‘Agartala Conspiracy’ sets the backdrop for the early days of 1970 when the eastern command of Pakistan in Dhaka (then Dacca) grew nervous at sweeping anger amongst the Bengali population against the dominant western Pakistani military presence in East Pakistan.

Salik writes that the Pakistani Army sought to implicate the Awami League and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman in the ‘Agartala conspiracy’ with the help of the Indian Army. Salik gives graphic details of the swift and speedy march of the Indian Army into East Pakistan. Salik chronicles that while Niazi had ordered his military to withdraw only with 75 per cent casualty, the Pakistani battalions rushed back as terminal fears gripped them about the marching Indian army personnel “who were guided by the volunteers of Mukti Vahini."

Salik details that the Pakistani Army kept guessing about which border flank in the Northeast will be the launchpad of attacks of the Indian Army. The Pakistani Major was attached as the press advisor of Niazi. He stayed close to the top military leadership of the Pakistani Army from 1969 until he along with Niazi was taken to the jail in Calcutta by the Indian Army after the surrender.

The events leading to the freedom of Bangladesh in 1971 chronicled by Salik show a stark similarity with the last month’s overthrow of Sheikh Hasina-led government in Bangladesh.

“Besides the labour, the students also contributed to the disturbed conditions in East Pakistan. When there were no examinations, they had their standing eleven points to lash the government with,” Salik details the students’ agitations in 1970. He adds: “These points, shorn of any educational content, were essentially political demands for provincial autonomy and Bengali nationalism.”

Salik further writes that, “the spirit that animated industrial labour and university students soon permeated Class IV government servants. Over 16,000 of them went on strike in early July to press for the acceptance of their nine-point demands." “

Soon other groups, including jewellers, tannery workers, journalists, family planning workers and tea-garden employees, were jumping on to the bandwagon of agitators. Their demands were formulated into points which numbered from three to fifteen,” adds Salik.

He also mentions that, “the crowning moment came on 4 September 1970, when beggars formed their East Pakistan Beggars’ Association and held a public meeting at the famous Paltan Maidan to press for the acceptance of their five-point charter of demands."

Salik shares December 7, 1971 meeting of Niazi with Governor of East Pakistan AM Malik. “As Dr Malik uttered the last part of his statement, the burly figure of General Niazi quaked and he broke into tears. He hid his face in his hands and started sobbing like a child,” writes Salik in the book.

He notes that soon the word spread among the Bengali staffers that “the sahibs are crying." This meeting, writes Salik, set the backdrop for Malik to begin asking Yahya Khan, the then president of Pakistan, to work out a ceasefire with India. The meeting had taken place while the Indian Army had set eyes on Dhaka.

Salik records his conversation with Niazi in the Fort William Jail in Calcutta after the surrender on the strategic failures of the war. Salik asks Niazi that when he became aware on December 3, 1971 that no further support from West Pakistan was forthcoming, why did he not create additional reserves.

“Because all sectors had come under pressure simultaneously. Dacca drains would have choked. Corpses would have piled up in the streets. Plague and other diseases would have spread. I will take 90,000 prisoners of war to Pakistan rather than face 90,000 widows and half a million orphans there,” Salik records Niazi telling him at Fort William in Calcutta.