Despite attack in Pampore, lessons not learnt

In the last seven months, the 35-km stretch between Bijbehera and Pampore has seen over six attacks on the security forces by the militants. It is a classic ambush territory. — villages with a sizeable population of sympathisers teem alongside the narrow stretch of the road. These unarmed workers are priceless in aiding and facilitating the “shoot & scoot” tactics of the militants by melting into the crowded villages. The latest attack in Pampore followed the same pattern, with eight CRPF jawans killed. Successful counter-insurgency is the art of integrating political, military, economic, psychological and civic actions in a seamless choreographed manner. Earlier successes in tackling insurgencies in Mizoram and Punjab involved hitting the sweet-spot of various governmental levers. In Kashmir, the governmental agencies and policy frameworks operate in silos.

Even within the security calculus, the immediate aftermath of Pampore exposed the operational un-integration and the latent bad blood between the Army and the Central police forces. While the Army reports to the defence ministry, the BSF, CRPF, SSB and others report to the home ministry. So when defence minister Manohar Parrikar remarked “doubt if the standard operating procedure was followed properly”, it was soon dismissed by the CRPF DG who said all laid-down procedures were “absolutely” adhered to. While the exact lacunas and corrective SOPs are yet to be fleshed out, the problem is a critical misalignment of security forces. Common sense dictates that given the principal role played by the Army, the Northern Army Commander ought to be the singular head of a centralised operational taskforce. The current structure of “unified headquarters” at Srinagar is a please-all structure for the top brass that does not force the singularity of objective, SOPs and operational actions. The top field commanders of the Army are insurgency-hardened veterans, and is not comparable to the IPS brass of Central forces.

The soldiers and organisation-bred command-level officers of the police forces are comparable and acquit themselves admirably on the field, as in the case of the Pampore incident where head constable Vir Singh and constable Satish Chand fired back 39 and 32 rounds respectively, before going down. Sadly, even basic requirements like bullet-proof vests and transportation vehicles are inadequate. Importantly, Pampore-like incidents are a manifestation of the political, economic and social frustrations that are beyond the scope of the security forces. In a democracy like ours, the security forces can only contain insurgents.

The societal structures fomenting the ongoing angst, mistrust and prejudices require political and civic inputs, as was done in the case of both Punjab and Mizoram. In the Valley, the security forces are ploughing a lonely furrow. The swelling of crowds at militant funerals and the obvious hardening of local perceptions suggest a worrisome trend. Clearly, the conflict of the “mind and heart” persists and the political integration of misguided elements is yet to happen. Endemic corruption and administrative laxity has accounted for umpteen “packages,” but no socio-economic upliftment in the Valley.

Lashkar-e-Tayyaba chief Hafiz Saeed’s son-in-law Khalid Waleed, had reportedly plotted the Pampore attack. The youth are increasingly ceding ground to radical entities. This dangerous security environment has to be contextualised with the oft-conflicting voices between the political and security classes — removal of AFSPA, minimal presence of the security apparatus, etc. It is difficult to maintain between security imperatives and minimal disturbance and interference via checking and frisking. The nature of conflict is asymmetric, and the solution lies in a holistic approach of which is not visible today. Tactical success in terms of electoral success by politicians, number of militants neutralised, quantum of civic spends by the administrators takes precedence over real strategic progress.