Syed Ata Hasnain | Israel-Hamas war: Does expansion loom large?

One of the prime differences between the Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, and the current standoff between Hamas and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), is the fact that the earlier wars ended in a double-quick timeframe with decisive IDF victories. The fact that Israel has continued for so long to delay a much-touted ground incursion into the Gaza Strip to achieve the neutralisation of Hamas exemplifies how far Israel’s adversaries have undergone in “military” transformation. Even currently there is no surety on the status of Israel’s potential victory as the IDF troops surround Gaza’s built-up areas from land, sea and air. In 2006, Hezbollah displayed a professional pro-pensity to perform in battle and hence the standoff was virtually stalemated in military terms. The method of conflict initiation by Hamas this time rightly received the widest condemnation from around the world. The deterrence angle imposed by Israel’s war-fighting proficiency must have weighed heavily on the Hamas psyche. Hamas’ terrorist-oriented concept actually does not fall under the ambit of the term “military”; it was designed without concern for civilian casualties to draw an “out of proportion” response. It also se-ems to have deterred a ra-pid Israeli response through the sheer depravity and impunity of its planned operation. One can visualise that there was a method in the madness in this conflict initiation.

On the face of it, the longer that this war persists the greater are the chances that it may spread beyond, into the volatile neighbourhood. The forms of warfare have changed quite drastically since 1973 — with terrorists, mercenary forces and other irregulars joining the fray in today’s wars. They usually play by no rules. Even the current standoff was initiated well outside anything called rules. Accordingly, Israel too has chosen not to follow the “holier than thou” advice that it is often receiving these days from all over the world. The dilemma of the United States is palpable because it is aware Israel cannot search and destroy Hamas surgically in the lanes and streets of Gaza. Hamas’ strategy was probably designed to create that dilemma both for Israel and the US, and for the international community at large.

“Gaza is going to suffer… no nation will agree that your neighbour will slau-ghter babies, women or people… Unfortunately, it’s happening. We live in a tough neighbourhood, and we need to survive… we have to be tough. We have no choice”. Those are the words of a retired Israeli general officer, Noam Tibon, who was forced to pick up a weapon and with a few other soldiers rescue his son and his family from a kibbutz targeted by Ha-mas. If that is the reality, I can only see that Hamas’ objective of making this a standoff as never before, something threatening Israel existentially and taking the war well beyond, could manifest. Its strategy perhaps included the revival of anti-Semitism due to the inevitable Israeli overkill response, which it probably anticipated. However, rarely do such suicidal strategies lead to planning for a second or third order effect.

The first strike by Hamas at Israeli civilian targets on October 7 was such a de-plorable act that it stunned the world, including much of the Arab world, which responded only in guarded tones. A month down the line, the cognitive side of the standoff appears changing, with perceptions about the Israeli response on Gaza being even more reprehensible than the Hamas strike. That over 9,000 Gaza civilians have been killed and humanitarian aid has been withheld is not aiding Israel. Is this what Hamas had planned? Moreover, is this the realist second order effect which is currently in the making; that is international opinion building against Israel to a breakpoint. There is the whole gamut of the presidential election in Ame-rica, where at one time the Jewish lobby was considered all-powerful and influential. This time an Islamic lobby seems to be the greater worry.

All this has ramifications on the regional order, which will control the eventual response. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are telling Washington that the crisis in Gaza could revive extremist groups which could target the entire Middle East region. The cascading sympathy for Palestinians could be exploited by Hamas for a greater transnational terror revival. Although groups such as Hezbollah are doing only the bare minimum to have a foot in the door in the war against Israel, it is unlikely that Hasan Nasrullah will wish to fight the war of Hamas without a clear plan or objective. Only if Israel actually starts to execute its threat of displacing the Palestinian population into the Sinai area of Egypt and attempts replicating that with the West Bank’s population into Jordan, will this go over the hump and lead to full-scale Islamic unity against Israel. Israel would probably realise that the stabilization of Israel-Egyptian ties has taken a long and arduous process. Making an enemy of Egypt will not go in Israel’s favour. There are enough leaderships who would not wish to see instability extending beyond the immediate battle zones. Saudi Arabia has been very balanced in approach and would not like to see a tilt in favour of turbulent forces such as ISIS and Hamas with their coming together. Saudi Arabia’s future ambitions of its nationhood based on culturally enlightened and modern ideology can never be facilitated if it supports a volatile coalition of Arab states. Iran senses this drawback of the Saudis. It could, at the behest of the Russians, try to create threats against Israel, but may be unwilling to go beyond a point. Recall how its threats against US Army bases in Iraq in January 2020, after the assassination of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, fizzled out when it was challenged.

A few facts stare in the face. First, no military solution is possible and no side can win this war; expectations from Hamas are zero, being terrorist in content and irrational by nature. Israel, as an established state, should work on isolating Hamas and cultivate international public opinion. Second, a change of leadership on both sides will enhance the chances of some stability, although solutions are some light years away. Those solutions lie in the realm of the two-state proposal which India has always supported. The world cannot afford any more bloodletting of such proportions but it is almost certain that both the Ukraine-Russia war and the Israel-Hamas war will not find any grounds to bring about a ceasefire anytime in the future. It’s far more important to prevent these fires from spreading.