Retrofit: J&K solution - What's on the table?

With Rajnath Singh visiting the Valley to interact with key constituents of the populace and Prime Minister Narendra Modi talking of a permanent solution within the four walls of the Constitution, New Delhi appears to be making yet another push to heal the wounds of disaffected Kashmiris. But there’s no clarity on what the scope of the dialogue will be, but if the Prime Minister is talking of a permanent solution, his mavens must have a broad framework to work with. It remains to be seen if all stakeholders, including Hurriyat hawks, will be brought to the table. Needlessly, the Sunni-dominant Valley is holding India and J&K state hostage with its perfidious approach. Autonomy is a loosely-defined term in Kashmir’s context, its throwback is to Article 370 and the 1952 Delhi Agreement. Pertinently, the State Autonomy Committee set up by Farooq Abdullah’s National Conference in 1996 hits the nail on the head in its 1999 report.

Undoubtedly, Sheikh Abdullah’s 1953 arrest and a succession of malleable CMs thereafter eroded the construct of the Instrument of Accession and the Delhi Agreement, leaving autonomy in tatters and impinging on the federal context in terms of the contractual relationship. Article 370 itself, the SAC report noted, “acquired a dangerously ambiguous aspect — designed to protect the state’s autonomy, it has been used systematically to destroy it”. Article 370, enshrined in the Indian Constitution to give Kashmir a “special status”, was based on a federal contract. Over time, a dismayed populace of Jammu and Ladakh have sought regional autonomy, but the SAC recommended maximum autonomy in 1999, categorically declaring: “The best course is for the President of India to repeal all orders which are not in conformity with the Constitution (Application to J&K Order 1950) and the terms of the 1952 Delhi Agreement.” Will this be the basis of the new “permanent solution”?

From the apogee of the Nehru-Sheikh Abdullah friendship that delivered J&K to India, the plates of history were soon shifting as the strife in Jammu began to prey on Sheikh Abdullah’s mind. The seeds of the seductive call to chaos were sown by the Delhi Agreement signed on July 24, 1952. Dr Jose Korbel, UNCIP member, in his book Danger in Kashmir, stated: “It gave to Kashmir special rights which other princely states never had... It was agreed the hereditary ruler would be replaced by a head of state to be elected by the constituent assembly/state assembly for a term of five years; however subject to ratification by the President of India. Second, fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India will apply to J&K subject to the provision that they will not be applicable to the programme of land reforms, including the expropriation of land without compensation, nor they should adversely affect security measures undertaken by the state govt.

Third, the Kashmir legislature ‘shall have the power to define and regulate the rights and privileges of the permanent residents of the state, more specially in regard to the acquisition of immovable property, appointments to services and like matters’. Fourth, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India was to be limited, as regards Kashmir, to inter-state disputes, to the fundamental rights applicable to the state and to matters of defence, foreign affairs and communications. The Govt. of India wanted the Supreme Court to be the final court of appeal in civil and criminal cases.” The distance between Nehru and Abdullah was growing by the minute. Jumping into this volatile mix was Mridula Sarabhai. Her July 17, 1953 letter to Sheikh Abdullah, just days before his dramatic August 9 arrest, was revelatory. It was evident Abdullah was no longer in a conciliatory mood and that full autonomy for Kashmir was the only thing he wanted now.

Though completely independent-minded, Sarabhai was a close associate of Panditji and knew Abdullah very well too. A general secretary of the Congress, she was secretary to Mahatma Gandhi and was well networked in Congress circles. Later, she worked tirelessly for Abdullah’s release. She wrote: “Soon after reaching Delhi, I handed over your letters to Jawaharlalji, Rafi Saheb and Maulana Saheb. To know they carried your feelings ‘that no useful purpose can be achieved by carrying on oft-talked subjects and hence you had decided not to come to Delhi’ — really, if I may say so, has come as a shock...”

“I thought I understood you and wanted to facilitate the way, but I find I was mistaken. In the morning talk, you were good enough to explain to me the basic issues and emphasis. Both Jawaharlalji and you should understand the need of the hour, and only then can a way be found. If the doors are closed between the two of you, what is the way out? I have taken the liberty of conveying my feelings to you and urge you again to reconsider my appeal to you and Jawaharlalji — that for Kashmir and India — for humanity and its confidence in both of you — please understand each other and find a way out. For such a national problem, talk and exchange of views, even though they might be ‘futile’, can never be useless.”

It is clear that a rapidly-fraying relationship was sought to be salvaged by Mridula Sarabhai, but all attempts at rapprochement were failing. But some of the salient points of the Delhi Agreement further distilled, that he signed off on but could not later digest. These were:
The decision to abolish the hereditary Dogra dynasty was accepted by New Delhi
The Indian Citizenship Act was made applicable to the state, but the state legislature was empowered to regulate the rights and privileges of permanent residents, specially over acquisition of immovable property and appointment to services
The right of state nationals who had gone to Pakistan or Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in 1947 or earlier, to return to their homes was acknowledged
The President of India was empowered to declare a state of emergency in case of external danger, but in case of internal disturbance the power could be exercised only at the request, or the concurrence of, the state government
The President of India was empowered to grant reprieve and commute death sentences
India agreed confiscation of jagirs without compensation shall permanently stand
The state was allowed its own flag, which was the flag of the National Conference party
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was extended to certain matters; and
It was agreed that Jammu and Ladakh should have cultural and regional autonomy

Greater autonomy versus full integration was what Sheikh Abdullah was grouching about. He argued as accession with India in any form or basis would finally involve the merger of the state with India, alternative solutions of the Kashmir problem must be discussed... He ruled out any accession to Pakistan, and referred to the alternatives of partition, plebiscite-cum-partition, independence of the state guaranteed by India and Pakistan. With Pakistan pressing for a solution and referring to Kashmir as a client state of India, the Sheikh’s delusions on flirting with the idea of independence for the Kashmir Valley cost him his job and J&K its autonomous character forever.