Retrofit: Win back J&K youth before it's too late
The youth in Kashmir have learnt to channelise their energies towards the Internet.
In the rough and tumble of rabid Islamic fundamentalism fuelled lately by the Internet, a new trend has emerged. The well-educated and well-heeled elite are taking to the gun, radicalised and schooled in Islamic jihad by the cold pipes that run the Web. What is so compelling that youth are taking to the gun in Molenbeek, Kashmir and now Dhaka? Home-grown terrorists inspired by Islamic State are resorting to barbarism, as the Dhaka attack showed. In Kashmir, where militancy was stamped out in the Valley, recent history is intertwined with the persona of Shiv Murari Sahai, who rose from a pistol-wielding thana in-charge in Srinagar to IGP Kashmir and is now back as additional DGP in charge of the state CID. Policeman to spymaster, few know modern Kashmir better than Sahai.
As head of the intelligence grid, Sahai’s legend grows manifold. It is well known that he keeps the roza during Ramzan and is guardian to a young Kashmiri boy, the son of his personal security officer who died in 2004.
Through his Facebook page, Sahai engages directly with Kashmiri youth and understands them better than most. My two visits to the Valley in 2012 revealed that restless Kashmiris had come to terms with the fact that Pakistan was no longer an option, and that India wouldn’t give up Kashmir. The third and most endearing, romantic dream of an “azad” Kashmir was, however, being burnished by the separatists and stoked by the Internet and social media. While most ordinary people want to live peacefully and enjoy the fruits of tourism and hopefully new industry, the youth, like everywhere, are more restless. Many have learnt to channelise their energies towards the Internet, on which radical propaganda is freely available. Aspirational youth want to make intuitive choices in taking decisions, but they have few options. Some do take the civil service exams, but others cry for “freedom”.
To understand this psyche, Sahai explained the complex ground realities in Kashmir after the intifada was quelled in 2010 in an interview to defenceforumindia, where he said: “Militancy has reduced dramatically. In 2011, we wiped out the entire leadership of several militant (outfits) and they haven’t been able to replace them. But AK-47s have been replaced by pistols, grenades and IEDs, used by recycled militants who join forces with radicalised young boys. That is becoming a great challenge. Our problem is a radicalised youth bulge. Some 50 per cent of the population is between 13 and 25. Parental and societal checks have failed... the elders are unable to restrain them. A similar youth bulge fuelled the radicalisation of agitations in West Asia. That is happening here too, (as) the separatist leadership draws inspiration from there.”
He explained: “There are some 25,000 released militants walking the streets... These people were released after completing prison terms or are out on bail. They are not ideologically compromised, like surrendered militants. They spread anti-state sentiment to the new generation. We have to absorb them into the mainstream before they radicalise the next generation.” The dreaded Masrat Alam tapped into this restiveness when briefly released. Using Internet tools, he made impassioned appeals to the Army to leave Kashmir and incited youth to target paramilitary forces. Espousing the cause of Islam and how it was in “danger”, he positioned himself as a champion of Muslim-majority Kashmir, in a bid to “de-hyphenate” the Valley from India.
The trigger for Kashmir’s travails began again in 2008 as the credo of street violence, that had nearly disappeared, resurfaced. It wasn’t a political issue, but an emotive one, the shenanigans over Amarnath shrine land, and Jammu’s economic blockade of the Valley that led to a deep sense of anguish and grievance that still exists deep down. Separatists losing space suddenly found new hope. This was followed in 2010 when the government’s inability to take action over Machhil (exposed as a fake encounter) created a chain reaction of agitation and deaths. A street protest would lead to a death (in police firing), triggering another protest, that led to more firing, unleashing a never-ending spiral of violence. It didn’t help that 120 people were killed in 2010, most of them adolescents.
The Institution for Studies, Learning and Analysis recently did a case study on “growing radicalisation among youth of J&K through social media”. It found radicalisation was “spreading among youth through cheap and accessible means like Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp”. A newspaper reported that as part of the study, a survey was done in which messages, posts, and conversations on chatrooms were intercepted on the basis of certain keywords on online platforms. Sahai is quoted as saying: “We found five lakh conversations (on) these keywords, of which around one lakh conversations are a matter of concern.”
He refused to give any further details on the nature of the conversations or keywords, indicating they might be on the perceived problem areas of Kashmir that get crowd support: militancy, freedom-azadi, anti-India sentiments, Islamism, Pakistan, Army and militant groups. Monitoring of social media through dedicated cells has now become routine in Kashmir’s always-evolving security apparatus. The newspaper added: “One of the key reasons, apart from easy Internet availability, for growing radicalisation is a twisted religious discourse. Decrease in the traditional form of religious practice in Sufi Islam and growing congregations of Wahhabi ideology through Ahl-e-Hadees factions is considered a major contributor in religious radicalisation. The focus of the de-radicalisation project is to reintegrate the youth back in the mainstream.” A part of the planned “de-radicalisation project” includes setting up a Social Media Monitoring Centre, to identify and counsel youth radicalised online and counter-propaganda that will highlight Islam’s message of peace.
Why has the narrative changed despite the surface calm? Having survived the Amarnath backlash and the Afzal Guru hanging, Kashmir is seeing the emergence of local religious fundamentalism that lures young people all over again. Burhan Wani, Ishaq Parray aka Newton, Naseer Ahmed Pandit, Zakir Bhat are among 60-odd new poster boys of the home-grown variety wearing battle fatigues, brandishing Kalashnikovs. The reality, however, is that Wani joined militancy over four years ago, Bhat in 2013, Newton became a militant over a year ago and was killed by the security forces in March. Abdul Rashid Bhat, a civil engineer with the state irrigation department, doesn’t want to have anything to do with his son for he has chosen to walk the path of peace, while his son has chosen the gun. This is the dichotomy of today’s Kashmir. Hindustan chodega nahin, Pakistan jana nahin, but “azadi” from India remains a dream for the young. A dream that they cannot get.