Tariq Hasan introduces and concludes this erratic but essential history by telling us why it was necessary to write Colonialism and the Call to Jihad in British India. The modern world — or the discriminating reader at least — needs to understand and historically place the conflict that has overtaken Islam with the wars between Shia and Sunni communities and nations, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and the murky role of the United States, Saudi Arabia and other countries in it. Closer to home, Hasan hopes that the lessons of Hindu-Muslim unity and contrived disunity in the colonial period can be learnt by the Hindutva brigade which seeks to drive a wedge between Hindus and the “minority” communities of India.
Before getting on to the erratic it’s necessary to stress the essential nature of the book which consists in bringing together research and biography from various sources which introduce us to the overlooked and forgotten personalities who contributed to the tradition and devoted their lives to resisting British colonial rule. Another essential function of the book is Hasan’s repeated definition of jihad, referring to its Quranic meaning and the interpretations of it through Islamic history and practice. He also makes useful, if sometimes confusing, distinctions between the doctrines of Wahhabism, Salafism, the Wallihullahi school of thought, Deobandism and its branches and Barelvi interpretations. These were the main currents of ideological inspiration for the jihadis whose lives, careers and ideas he revives.
The “jihad” against the British with which Hasan begins his chapters isn’t really a battle against the British. He outlines the life of Saiyid Ahmad Barelvi who migrated from Uttar Pradesh to the North West to defend the Muslim Pathan tribes who were being persecuted by Rana Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab. In the course of this history, Hasan quotes Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal’s clarification:
Few concepts have been subjected to more consistent distortion than the Arabic word jihad — whose literal meaning is ‘striving for a worthy and ennobling cause’ but which is commonly thought today to mean ‘holy war’ against non-Muslims. It is paradoxical that Islam, whose very meaning is salam or peace, has come to be seen as a belligerent religion with fanatical adherents determined to wage perpetual war against unbelievers…
Barelvi’s jihad against the injustice under which the Pathan tribes suffered comes to nothing. Ranjit Singh wins and Hasan attributes the defeat to betrayal and double-crosses amongst the Pathan forces he has made alliances with. The dissension arose because of differing interpretations of jihad. Barelvi wanted a principled approach to fighting what he saw as injustice. The Pathan warlords on his side broke ranks on the issue of plunder and sharing the spoils of war.
Another character, lost to the pages of most histories of the traumatic events of 1857, known variously as the Indian mutiny and as the First War of Independence, was Ahmadullah Shah, the maulvi of Faizabad. In Hasan’s account, Shah was a cleric with formidable appeal and inspired military tactics. He led the mutineers (or patriotic sipahis, as Hasan would prefer) against the British in Lucknow. He was the commander or one of the commanders of the siege of the British Residency in that city. “The rebellion was, after months, defeated by the reinforced British force which had held out for months.”
Colonel Malleson a contemporary officer in the Bengal infantry and first-hand chronicler of the 1857 rebellion (I’m staying neutral) records that it was Ahmadullah who excited the East Indian Company sipahis to revolt by pointing out that the cartridges they were using were deliberately greased with pig and cow fat to defile them and make them lose caste and religion. Is Ahmadullah’s defilement speech the first mention of this? It’s always puzzling as these sipahis revolt in the morning and then use the same cartridges to kill their officers in the afternoon.
The rebels at Lucknow were, after the fall of Bahadur Shah in Delhi, defeated. Ahmadullah fled and made an alliance with Bijris Qadr, who had been nominated as the ruler of Awadh in exile. Their joint forces resisted the renewed British assault but some of Bijris Qadr’s officers betrayed Shah in pursuit of plunder. He was defeated again. For a third time, he raised a force to confront the British and was again betrayed by his supposed ally the Raja of Pawayan who laid a trap to deliver him to the Company’s forces. The Raja got a pay-off. Divide and rule? After the defeat of the 1857 rebellion several organisations arose devoting themselves to fighting colonial rule. Two of the most elaborate schemes of revolt were known as the Christmas Day plot and the Silk Conspiracy case. Both of these plots in 1915 and the second in 1916 were hatched abroad in the US by the Gadhar Party and several Muslim organisations allied to them. Each of these plots planned to overthrow British imperialism in India with the help of Germany, Turkey, Afghanistan and they even attempted to recruit the maharajas of India to revolt. The Silk Conspiracy (surely there should be novels about this episode?) was so called because the conspirators communicated via Mecca, with each other on letters written on silk handkerchiefs. The plots were detected by British intelligence in each case and defeated. The detection involved betrayal by native officials. Divide and rule?
The conspirators were exiled to the Andamans and to Malta, but their spirit wasn’t broken as, on their release, they returned to India and continued to inspire sedition or jihad against the Raj. In the final stages of the Independence struggle, Hasan relates the involvement of the jihadis on either side of the argument for and against the Partition. This last history contains necessary portraits of figures such as Obaidullah Sindhi, Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madani and others who contributed to the secular ideas that the Gandhian and national unity project adopted. As far as the erraticism of the book goes, Hasan sometimes gives us lists of forgettable names involved in forgettable incidents, much as the Old Testament tells us who begat whom. He also tells us about himself and his own life and family, and one couldn’t immediately see the relevance to the history.
My two reservations with this necessary book: The East Indian Company, until the Victorian era, specifically forbade Christian missionaries from attempting the conversion of Hindus or Muslims to Christianity. Hasan insists this was the cause of Muslim unrest and quotes William Dalrymple as saying it was. Historian Roderick Matthews specifically challenges and discounts this and says it didn’t happen. Secondly, Hasan repeatedly resorts to the popular historical theory of “divide and rule” to explain why an episode of the jihad failed. In each of these cases of failure, the participants seem very willing to succumb to the temptations of the division. Was Satan or the serpent really to blame? Or did Adam just fancy a bit of the apple?
