While the Indian judiciary is widely respected for its role in upholding constitutional principles, the lack of an independent oversight mechanism has drawn criticism. Strengthening accountability measures is, therefore, crucial to ensuring transparency and reinforcing public confidence in the judicial system
As the guardian of the Constitution, the judiciary plays a pivotal role in India’s democratic framework. Public trust in the institution is fundamental to its legitimacy, and ensuring judicial accountability is essential to maintaining this trust. While judges of the higher judiciary enjoy security of tenure and protection from external pressures, occasional instances of misconduct and ethical lapses highlight the need for a more effective oversight mechanism. A well-defined and transparent accountability framework is not merely desirable, it is indispensable to preserving credibility and upholding the rule of law.
However, judicial accountability should not be perceived as a threat to judicial independence. Rather, it serves as a cornerstone of a well-functioning democracy. The absence of a robust system of checks and balances has led to concerns over opacity within the judiciary. While the Indian judiciary is widely respected for its role in upholding constitutional principles, the lack of an independent oversight mechanism has drawn criticism. Strengthening accountability measures is, therefore, crucial to ensuring transparency and reinforcing public confidence in the judicial system.
Need for a Stronger Framework: India’s judicial accountability framework is shaped by constitutional provisions, statutory laws, and past reform efforts. The Constitution prescribes the process for removing Supreme Court and high court judges under Articles 124(4) and 217(1)(b), allowing impeachment only on grounds of “proved misbehaviour” or “incapacity”. However, this process, governed by the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is complex and rarely invoked, with no judge having been successfully impeached to date.
Impeachment requires substantial parliamentary support, beginning with a motion signed by 100 Lok Sabha MPs or 50 Rajya Sabha members of Parliament, followed by an inquiry conducted by a committee of judges and jurists. If misconduct is established, Parliament must approve the motion with a majority of the total membership of the house coupled with a majority of two thirds of the members present and voting in either house or jointly if a joint session of both the houses is held with both houses meeting together. An intentionally high threshold designed to safeguard judicial independence. While this safeguard prevents arbitrary removal, it has also rendered the process largely redundant in addressing judicial misconduct.
Recognising the need for a more pragmatic approach, Parliament introduced the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill in 2010. The bill sought to establish enforceable judicial standards and introduce mechanisms to handle complaints against judges, including a National Judicial Oversight Committee, a Complaints Scrutiny Panel, and an Investigation Committee.
I had the honour of leading the discussions on this Bill on behalf of the Treasury Benches on December 28, 2011.
By creating a structured complaint system, the bill aimed to balance accountability with judicial independence. After undergoing scrutiny by a Standing Committee, the bill was passed by the Lok Sabha in March 2012. However, it was never discussed in the Rajya Sabha due to the prorogation of the 15th Lok Sabha on May 18, 2014. Since then, no formal attempt has been made to reintroduce the legislation.
Limits of the ‘In-House Procedure’: In response to concerns over judicial misconduct, the Supreme Court introduced an in-house procedure in 1999 as an internal mechanism for handling complaints against judges. Though not mandated by law, this framework enables the judiciary to conduct preliminary inquiries while shielding itself from external interference. However, the process remains largely opaque, raising questions about its effectiveness in ensuring accountability. The recent decision decision of the Chief Justice of India to release certain prima-facie material of the “in-house process” recently in a “matter” is a departure from the past practice.
Under this mechanism, complaints are initially assessed by the Chief Justice of India or the respective high court chief justice. If deemed credible, a committee of senior judges reviews the matter. However, the findings of these inquiries are not made public, and judges facing adverse findings are typically advised to resign or step aside from judicial work. Since this procedure lacks statutory backing and does not impose legal penalties, it has often been criticised as inadequate for enforcing true accountability.
The in-house procedure was designed to uphold judicial dignity and independence, but its confidential nature has fuelled skepticism. While protecting judges from political pressure is crucial, the absence of an independent oversight body limits public trust in the system’s ability to address ethical concerns. True judicial accountability cannot rely solely on self-regulation; it must also instill public confidence in the judiciary’s commitment to transparency and ethical integrity.
Moreover, the in-house procedure lacks uniformity in its implementation. Different courts may adopt varying approaches in dealing with allegations, leading to inconsistencies in handling complaints. The absence of clear procedural guidelines further weakens its effectiveness, as there is no statutory requirement for judges to comply with the recommendations of inquiry committees.
Another major concern is the lack of deterrence. Since the process does not involve any formal legal consequences, judges found guilty of misconduct are often allowed to resign quietly, escaping public scrutiny. This not only undermines accountability but also deprives complainants of a sense of justice. Without an independent appellate mechanism, there is no recourse for those dissatisfied with the outcome of in-house inquiries.
Strengthening Judicial Accountability: While the in-house procedure serves as an initial safeguard against judicial misconduct, its lack of statutory backing limits its effectiveness. A stronger framework is needed, one that upholds judicial independence while ensuring allegations of misconduct are addressed transparently and fairly.
One possible reform is the establishment of a permanent, independent body to oversee judicial conduct. Comprising retired judges and legal experts with very rigorous safeguards and guardrails, this body should have statutory authority to investigate complaints and recommend appropriate action. Such a mechanism would reinforce accountability without undermining judicial autonomy.
Another key reform would be greater transparency in judicial inquiries. While fairness and privacy must be protected, making inquiry outcomes publicly accessible would help build public trust. The current secrecy surrounding the process has led to doubt, whereas measured disclosure would reinforce confidence in the judiciary.
Revisiting the lapsed Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, with necessary improvements, could also provide a structured approach to handling complaints against judges. The bill’s core provisions; establishing enforceable judicial standards and a formal complaint mechanism, remain relevant and could offer a balanced solution between self-regulation and external oversight.
Most importantly, Parliament should enact a comprehensive law granting statutory legitimacy to the in-house procedure. By embedding judicial oversight within a legal framework, such legislation would ensure complaints are handled according to a laid down process, penalties are applied consistently, and public confidence in the judiciary is strengthened. A clear and binding accountability mechanism is essential to preserving both judicial integrity and democratic principles.
