Pavan K. Varma | Should Indian diplomacy be faith-based or hard-nosed?

There are two major myths in the practice of foreign policy which need to be debunked. The first is that the yardstick of its success must depend on the “approval ratings” you have globally. The second is that idealism should be primary, and national self-interest, secondary. A successful foreign policy should win you respect, not necessary certificates of “good” conduct. Idealism is essential, but only in an ideal world. Real politique is what matters in an imperfect world.

For many years after Independence, we sought to imbue our foreign policy with the high morality that guided our freedom movement. Ahimsa was a remarkable policy to defeat Britain, then the mightiest military power in the world. But as an independent nation we needed to invest in our military capabilities against hostile forces. The disastrous defeat in the war with China in 1962 starkly showed that non-violence, or trust in the goodwill of other countries, was bad foreign policy.

We demonstrated correct Chanakyan stratagem in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. It was the right combination of idealistic moralising and the hardheaded pursuit of national interest. The ruthless regime of President Gen. Yahya in Islamabad thought that it could use repression to bring the Bengalis in East Pakistan to their knees. India was flooded by millions of refugees and could not remain uninvolved. As Gen. Yahya bungled, India deftly took advantage, entered East Pakistan, trained the Mukti Bahini or Bangla freedom fighters, and repulsing Pakistan’s attacks on our western flank, succeeded in dividing Pakistan.

But, the old hold of impractical idealism still held sway. In the Simla Agreement signed on July 2, 1972, India, inexplicably, returned to Pakistan 13,000 km of territory it had captured during the 1971 war. It was, to my mind, unnecessary benevolence — if that is what it can be called — because Pakistan was the aggressor, had lost the battle, and we had some 90,000 of its soldiers in our captivity as bargaining leverage. Moreover, Pakistan was still illegally holding on to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. To be so generous to a verifiably weakened Pakistan, without extracting our due pound of flesh, was bad foreign policy since it was against national self-interest.

This attempt to sit on a high moral pedestal was again visible in 1974, when Indira Gandhi demonstrated India’s nuclear power capability. For a recently independent and still largely impoverished country, it was a major achievement, not only in terms of the prowess of our scientists, but also because in a hostile neighbourhood, where China was a nuclear weapons power, it was a great deterrent. However, in an unwarranted projection of idealism, Indira Gandhi voluntary abdicated the choice of weaponising it. It was a mistake. If she had carried that test to its logical conclusion, we would have certainly faced adverse consequences from the unfair monopoly of the few powerful nuclear weapon powers, but India’s standing in the world would have risen, as would our ability to better defend ourselves. India finally became a nuclear power in 1998 under the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government, almost a quarter of a century after it had demonstrated its ability to become one. There is no other example in history of this kind of needless “sacrifice”.

In May 1999, Pakistan launched the Kargil invasion. The intrusion into our territory was verifiable, and our troops were sitting ducks for the Pakistani infiltrators perched on vantage mountain heights. In such a situation, any self-respecting nation would have authorised the Air Force to cross the Line of Control and destroy the staging posts and supply lines of the invaders. But instead, we went around the world collecting certificates of restraint. The result was that, even though our brave soldiers successfully repulsed the invaders, as per official statistics we lost 527 officers and other ranks, while over a thousand were injured. This exhibition of restraint, in the face of the certain death of the young flowers of our armed forces, must have few parallels in military history. We have only to think how different the reaction would have been in France, America, Britain or China if a dozen body bags arrived every day in their capital as a result of verified and unprovoked enemy intrusion in their territory.

Our foreign policy often lacks strong responses. For instance, when in 2008, China decided to give stapled visas to our citizens in Arunachal, which it illegally claims as its territory, and repeated the practice in 2023, instead of just protesting, our response should have been to give similar visas to Chinese of Tibetan origin. This is a language the world — and China — respects. On the other hand, sometimes without adequate reason, we act the bully, most noticeably with Nepal in 2015, when we blockaded the land-locked nation for over six months, creating great economic and humanitarian hardship, and thereby further strengthening China’ growing presence there.

But finally, I think we are changing, and showing indications of hard-nosed diplomacy. In the ongoing fracas with Canada, we have shown the red flag to its policy of openly encouraging terrorism to divide our country. Similarly, the recent India-China partial truce, leading to disengagement along the Line of Actual Control, is not unrelated to our much greater investment in strengthening our armed forces and border infrastructure in this theatre. Again, the Balakot retaliatory surgical in February 2029, after the terrorist outrage of Pulwama, sent the right message to Pakistan.

This, however, should not lead us to complacency. China has still not restored the status quo ante after its incursions in 2022, and future incursions by it will happen. Nor has Pakistan sponsored terrorism ended. An essential part of diplomacy has to be continuously upgraded intelligence and counter-intelligence. We are short of optimal strength in this area. It is said that as a gesture of “goodwill” to Pakistan, PM I.K. Gujral dismantled much of our intelligence apparatus in that country.

Foreign policy must be a bi-partisan political issue. It must be squarely based on national self-interest, however much we camouflage it with idealistic posturing. This is precisely how other countries with pretensions to great power status act. Ultimately, nations respect nations that respect themselves.