Syed Ata Hasnain | The Pak-Afghan standoff & its repercussions for India

We need to recall that the Afghan Taliban, in its organised avatar, owes its origins to the Pakistan-US-Saudi alignment during the post-1979 period when the Soviet Union launched its invasion of Afghanistan. The Taliban movement originated in Pashtun nationalism which was exploited by these players through enhancement of the passions of resistance against the Soviets. The millions of refugees who came out of Afghanistan in 1979-80 were housed in camps on the Pakistan-Afghan border and with external support were fed and ideologically motivated to fight the Soviets. From them arose the Taliban, who were in power by 1996 and thereafter have always controlled the destiny of Afghanistan. Pakistan has held sway over the Taliban through the challenging times and during the period of the occupation by the United States and its allies. The Taliban’s resistance to the US occupation for 20 years could not have been possible without the moral and material support, and the safe havens provided to the Taliban leadership and fighters, by Pakistan. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 was considered a moment of victory for the Af-Pak combine. By a natural corollary, the results of that should have all gone to the advantage of Pakistan in the post-conflict stage that is still under way. There are several reasons why they have not.

The Afghan Taliban’s vision for their country’s future is not aligned with Pakistan’s interests. Historically, Pakistan has sought to exert influence over Afghanistan through the backing of Islamist groups. That has now come a cropper after the return of the Taliban. The latter is motivated by its own success over the Soviets and then over the US and Nato, that reinforces the age-old perception about the undefeatability of the Afghan people. This further adds to Taliban pride in not accepting what is perceived as the “imposed border” called the Durand Line as the Pakistan-Afghanistan land border. This line is viewed as a relic of colonialism and has never been formally recognised.

Another point of contention is Pakistan’s expectation of a “payback” with the Taliban taking action against the Pakistani terrorist group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Instead, the Afghan Taliban has provided it safe sanctuary and permission to operate from within Afghan territory. The Afghan Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan has deteriorated due to this combination of factors, including disagreements over the Durand Line, ideological differences and a struggle for space and influence. It also aspires to assume the leadership of the Islamic movement towards attainment of the legendary caliphate. Pakistan too is a serious contender for that in the global Islamic movement. This competition isn’t good for peace between them.

The Afghan Taliban’s ambition is driven by belief in its own ideological legitimacy and sense of history, both of which tend to reinforce its perceived mandate to lead the Islamic world. Its willingness to engage with India is based on some legitimate reasons. First is the necessity to win economic support regionally, before aspiring for a larger ambit for its role; the current scope of economic support from Pakistan is next to nil. Also, the perception about India remains positive in the minds of the Afghan population, many of whom make a beeline for India for medical treatment and the general “feel good” which comes from India’s openness and better quality of life. The Taliban probably also assesses that its control over Afghanistan gives it the strategic ability to exert influence over the broader region of Central Asia, Middle East and South Asia. Being at the crossroads of civilisations perhaps evokes a “Middle Ages” perception of the ability to spread ideology to the length and breadth of these regions. Pakistan has historically viewed itself as the flag-bearer of the Islamic world, with its large army and its nuclear capability. The Afghan Taliban challenge is from unexpected quarters and is damning even for the abiding Pakistani belief in the doctrine of strategic depth.

To top it all for Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban has good relations with both China and Russia. Its relations with India are developing well despite the lack of diplomatic recognition. Though India has no truck with the TTP, the combined effect of an active western border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the deeper involvement of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism forces against the TTP creates a temporary military advantage for India. Pakistan would need to be conscious of that while formulating its strategy in Jammu and Kashmir. An over-the-top Pakistan sponsored terrorist action in J&K with the intent of exhibiting relevance and commitment could turn into a trigger for a much stronger Indian response than may otherwise be expected.

Pakistan has often treated the turbulent western border region with a degree of contempt. It has never failed to use heavy weaponry and indulged in large-scale human rights violations through mass evacuation of villages and their full destruction through aerial bombing. The war against the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has also been intensifying, but without any major gains. The BLA has been targeting the Chinese workers and staff working on BRI projects. Obviously, Pakistan’s security forces are overstretched with issues of their own making. Pakistan’s military action inside Afghanistan will fuel anti-Pakistan sentiments among the Afghan population and further alienate Pakistani Pashtuns, adding more fuel to the existing fires. It’s not as if the Afghan fighters will inflict defeat or gain any advantage in a military standoff with Pakistan, but this kind of disharmony tends to perpetuate problems for Pakistan at a time when it must focus on economic issues and development. The developing India-Afghanistan relationship will probably flower faster given the situation on the Afghan border. Under these circumstances, should India calibrate a quid pro quo threat against Pakistan if something similar builds up on our eastern borders with Bangladesh? There is room for discussion on this subject.