Nothing about Kashmir is monochromatic. Some months ago, around 200 former Israeli generals and Mossad and Shin Beth heavy hitters, under the collective called Commanders for Israel’s Security, delivered a composite “Security First Plan”, which prescribes a combination of security, civil and economic measures aimed at keeping the promise of a two-state solution alive and encouraging Israel’s integration into a regional system with pragmatic Sunni Arab states. In real terms, managing the conflict in Gaza and West Bank has become more and more difficult. Grappling with waves of intifada has proved cumbersome and left its security apparatus unimaginably fatigued. Detect, deny and defend has been at the very kernel of the stratagem used by the Israeli Defence Forces in Gaza and the West Bank. In India, the Central government too must realise while Jammu and Kashmir is unalterably a part of sovereign India with legal and constitutional sanctity, new tactics need new responses.
Self-preservation was paramount for the paramilitary forces as they tried to cope with the latest round of intifada strikes and stone-pelting incidents. And rightly so! But the general impression in the Valley is that excessive force was used by the forces as they tried to quell protesters. “Hamara khoon pani aur unka khoon, khoon” — is the refrain from both sides. Though in the rough and tumble of a battle-like situation, nobody really cares. Perhaps it is time to re-examine the concept of the Kashmir Valley’s Unified Command structure, in which the civil-military administration coalesces. Over time Kashmir has seen fidayeen and lone-wolf attacks, but the security grid has been uncompromising and impenetrable in its approach to terror. While the Unified Command was created as far back as 1993, its efficacy was truly visible in early 2001 when it dealt with the force multiplier of the jihad factory through its counter-insurgency units.
Lt. Gen. Moham-med Ahmed Zaki was in many ways the Unified Command’s architect. In 1986-87, he commanded the 19 Infantry Division in the Valley, and having performed admirably, he returned in October 1989 as GOC, 15 Corps, till June 1991. In October 1991, he returned as adviser to the J&K governor till January 1993, and was recalled once again in May that year as adviser for his knowledge and expertise (till June 1995). A master handler in counter-insurgency operations, his role was crucial in those trying days. In the ping-pong that followed in Kashmir with spells of President’s Rule and elected governments, in 1996 Farooq Abdullah became chief minister, taking over as boss of the Unified Command, replacing Gen. K.V. Krishna Rao. With the GOCs of 15 Corps and 16 Corps as security advisers, some element of order was restored. But then, as often with such structures, the meetings tapered off till the next big blow.
Then came Kargil. A 1999 assessment of the Unified Command’s functioning says several disparate security agencies operated under differing “rules of engagement” and “legislated authority” without the means to induce coherence. This is still its biggest bugbear. Let us see why. The Unified Command Headquarters in Kashmir comprises the Army, BSF, CRPF, intelligence agencies and the J&K state police. There are just too many contrasting elements. But such was the suffocation on the Kashmir border that since last year, the Pakistan-backed insurgents, facing stringent policing on the J&K border, tried different tactics, and went for the soft underbelly of northern Punjab. Gurdaspur and Pathankot followed. The J&K counter-terrorism model is robust where the Army is given primacy in the war on terror. Former Northern Army commander and Kashmir veteran Lt. Gen. Syed Ata Hasnain, now retired, can explain things better: “Top functionaries of all security forces and intelligence agencies are part of the Unified Command. Interestingly, under the corps commanders, with the co-chairmanship of the DGP, top functionaries of their zones and formation commanders of the Army, there exist core groups which meet at least once a month and more often during crisis situations (as in 2010) to take stock of intelligence and future events.
There are similar sub-core groups down the chain right up to brigade level where intelligence (officers) form a very important element. With experience, the intelligence-sharing system is now robust, with everyone picking up the phone to speak to each other. Operations in Srinagar and Jammu city remain the purview of the DGP, who can request assistance from the Army. However, all other operations in the countryside and LoC’s vicinity are either conducted by the Army alone (counter-infiltration) or jointly by the Army and J&K police, with command in the hands of the Army. The AFSPA plays an important role in this. The CRPF plays a vital role in control of civil strife and in counter-terror operations assists in sealing and responding to protests.”
This is perhaps is where the problem of handling the intifada manifests itself strongly. The visible presence of the Army means everything in fatigues is considered “fauji” — which isn’t the case. A distinction must be made — the Army deals with counter-insurgency while the paramilitary and J&K police handles civil strife, crowd control and riot management. Civil strife is where a new paradigm must be evolved. Pellet guns have taken a rather heavy toll. Perhaps, on the lines of the Israeli model, top Army, paramilitary, intelligence and civil officials with Kashmir expertise must sit down and brainstorm to come up with new responses.
Another major issue is that of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, and persistent demands for its revocation, or at least dilution. Successive governments have called for changes, but we have also seen that Kashmir is secure because of the Indian Army’s outstanding contribution. The PDP-BJP alliance has promised the people that it “will examine the need for denotifying disturbed areas”, which “will enable the Union government to take a final view on the continuation of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in these areas”. The whole of J&K, barring Leh and Kargil districts, are “disturbed”, notified as such under Section 3 of the Armed Forces (J&K) Special Powers Act 1990, as well as provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act 1992.
The most “draconian law” in the eyes of most people is the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act 1978, that empowers the administration to detain without trial a person for up to two years. It is easy to say that Kashmir needs a healing touch. The reality is that Burhan Wani was a terrorist who was killed during ongoing operations. He chose the gun, and decided to wage war against the State, which is unacceptable. The people of Kashmir and sections of the Indian media have tried to project him as a martyr, which he definitely wasn’t, for he was nothing other than a misguided youth. Nevertheless, the Unified Command has to come up with a better model to contain civil strife in the state so that casualties are minimised.
